

MID-AMERICA

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Foss of Massachusetts: Demagogue or Progressive?

From 1911 to 1914 the governor's chair in Massachusetts was occupied by Eugene Noble Foss, the first Democrat to be re-elected to the office since the early 1890's. One of the most stormy and colorful figures in early twentieth century Bay State politics, Foss rose to prominence at the height of the progressive era. But his credentials as a progressive were hotly disputed. He was distrusted by many of the older Democratic reformers, rejected by most insurgent Republicans, and scorned by the Roosevelt Progressives. He was, said one opponent, nothing but an "extraordinary political charlatan," who "has out-Barnumed Barnum, and will go down in history as the great humbug of the 20th century."¹ Foss's enemies were legion. As a result his fame was short-lived, and after 1914 he soon sunk to what his detractors believed was a well-deserved political obscurity. Yet if his personality and methods alienated him from most of the more conventional progressives, Foss achieved more than many of his critics. On the whole his recommendations were farsighted, and he deserves some credit for the numerous reforms enacted during his years as governor and for a few real contributions to the progressive cause.

Foss was a wealthy manufacturer for whom politics was only a temporary side-interest. Born in West Berkshire, Vermont, in 1858, he attended the University of Vermont for two years before beginning a business career as a traveling salesman. In 1882 he settled in Jamaica Plain, Massachusetts, as manager of the B. F. Sturtevant Company, which manufactured boilers. Assisted by his marriage to his employer's daughter, Foss advanced rapidly. He

¹ *Practical Politics*, Boston, September 16, 1911, 3520.

became president of the Sturtevant Company after his father-in-law's death and later branched into other business activities. By 1910 he had built four cotton mills in Massachusetts, was president of the Becker Milling Machine Company, and was a director of several firms, including a bank, the Union Stock Yards Company of Chicago, the Eastern Steamship Company, and the Brooklyn Transit Company.² Foss was politically inexperienced when he began his attack upon the policies of the conservative Republican organization in Massachusetts, but he was sufficiently equipped with money and ambition to make himself heard.

Foss entered the political arena as a champion of tariff reform and reciprocity. The high protective tariff was an article of faith for Bay State Republican leaders. However, Foss argued that it stifled business and unnecessarily increased the cost of living. Reciprocity agreements, he said, would check the hostile tariff legislation set up against the United States and enable Americans to increase their exports of manufactured goods. Furthermore, Foss maintained that reciprocity was quite compatible with Republicanism. Even McKinley had shown interest in it.³ His critics charged Foss with being selfishly interested in promoting tariff reductions only on his competitors' products, although he strongly denied the accusation and insisted that he could prosper with a drastically lowered tariff on iron and steel products, including items which he manufactured, as long as such reductions applied "to the whole iron and steel industry from the coal and ore up."⁴ Quite likely, of course, Foss's motives were not entirely disinterested. But during his stormy political career he remained a consistent advocate of tariff reform, whether standing as a Republican, Democrat or independent.

In September, 1902, Foss began his political career by challenging the Republican organization's choice for candidate from the

² *Boston Herald*, October 23, 1910; *Biographical Directory of the American Congress: 1774-1927*, Washington, 1928, 981; "The Buoyancy of Mr. Foss," *Current Literature*, LI (December, 1911), 615-618; George Perry Morris, "Eugene Noble Foss," *The Independent*, LXIX (November 17, 1910), 1071-1073.

³ *Reciprocity: A Republican Issue. Addresses Upon This Topic By Henry B. Blackwell and Eugene Noble Foss before the Massachusetts Club, Boston, June 11, 1904*, Pamphlet, Massachusetts State Library; Eugene Noble Foss, "American Manufactures and Foreign Markets," *American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, Annals*, XXIX (May, 1907), 515-521. See also Foss to Edward Atkinson, January 13, 1903, and May 6, 1904, Atkinson Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society.

⁴ *Congressional Record*, 61 Cong., 2d Sess., 1910, Vol. 45, Part 6, p. 6697.

eleventh congressional district. In his campaign he advocated reciprocity with Canada and free coal, iron and hides.⁵ To the dismay of the machine, enough Foss delegates were selected at local party caucuses to insure his nomination. Henry Cabot Lodge was appalled. "I have never seen anything like it," he wrote to Roosevelt. "He is mad with pride and vanity. . . . I sometimes think that the 'business man in politics' is too often one who has no business to be there."⁶ However, Foss failed to disrupt the state convention, which accepted the usual standpat platform without mention of tariff reform, and in the general election he lost to the Democrat, John A. Sullivan.

Foss made his next effort in the spring of 1904 when he ran for delegate-at-large to the Republican National Convention. Although he received little support at the local caucuses, he carried his fight into the state convention, only to be badly beaten by the organization candidate. Foss's humiliation was made all the worse by Senator Lodge, who denounced him vehemently and virtually read him out of the Republican Party.⁷ The machine triumphed, but the consequences of the fight ultimately were serious. Lodge had turned Foss into an implacable enemy who did not rest until he had won a considerable measure of vindication.

In the fall of 1904 Foss again won the Republican nomination for congressman from the eleventh district, thanks in large measure to a 1903 law that provided for a direct primary election to select the candidates from the ninth, tenth and eleventh districts. Again Foss received only tepid support from his party, and lost to Sullivan in the November election.⁸ Foss's bitterness against Lodge grew. At a reciprocity convention held at Chicago in August, 1905, Foss accused the Senator of deliberately wrecking the Hay-Bond reciprocity treaty with Newfoundland under the pretense of making its fishing provisions acceptable to Gloucester, Massachusetts.⁹ At the state convention in October of that year he branded Lodge's speech in defense of protection as an insult to the majority of voters in Massachusetts. The Republican loss of the governorship

⁵ *Boston Herald*, September 7 and 21, 1902.

⁶ Lodge to Roosevelt, September 25, 1902, in Henry Cabot Lodge, ed., *Selections From the Correspondence of Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge: 1884-1918*, New York, 1925, I, 530.

⁷ *Boston Herald*, April 5, 1904; John A. Garraty, *Henry Cabot Lodge*, New York, 1953, 239.

⁸ *Boston Herald*, September 28 and November 9, 1904.

⁹ *Ibid.*, August 17, 1905. For a defense of Lodge's position on the treaty see Garraty, *Lodge*, 236-238.

in 1904, said Foss, "has not taught the senator that there is no profit in a speech that will sweep a machine convention and defeat its nominees."¹⁰

Foss was not easily discouraged, and in 1906 he sought the nomination for lieutenant-governor. That office was then held by the ultra-conservative, high protectionist Eben S. Draper. But it was clear that Foss's real target was Senator Lodge.

The machine has made up the slate for all offices twelve years in advance. . . . No man has any chance of political preferment in Massachusetts who will not wear the collar of the political boss of the State. . . . If for no other reason than that it is corrupt, the Lodge machine should be annihilated. We have had the "scholar in politics" long enough in Massachusetts. Let us try a few businessmen, who when they say they will stand for a thing, will come somewhere near doing it.¹¹

Yet for all Foss's efforts, he was quite unable to attract a large following within the Republican Party at that time. He failed by a wide margin to win the support of enough delegates to the state convention to insure his nomination. As a result, he did not even bother to attend the 1906 convention, which was controlled perfectly by the organization, and which adopted a strictly standpat platform.¹² After several years of battling the machine, Foss was no better off than when he began. Most rank-and-file Republicans in Massachusetts were not yet unduly disturbed by the high protective tariff or by the Lodge-Crane domination of their party. After all, as in the case of the Gloucester fishermen, Lodge was careful to guard the interests of his own constituents. If some groups did not fare as well, they tended, like the shoe manufacturer William L. Douglas, who won the governorship in 1904, to seek relief in the Democratic Party. Foss's efforts in politics from 1902 to 1906 clearly demonstrated that he had little prospects for advancement as a Republican. Obviously his hope lay elsewhere.

Foss's opportunity came a few years later. After a brief period of political inactivity, he shifted his allegiance to the Democrats and in 1909 received the nomination for lieutenant-governor. The Democrats, united for the first time in years, were attracted by Foss's large purse, and by the hope that he would draw the sup-

¹⁰ *Boston Herald*, October 7, 1905.

¹¹ Foss to Channing Smith, July 24, 1906, published in the *Boston Evening Transcript*, July 27, 1906.

¹² Lodge to Roosevelt, September 29, 1906, in Lodge, ed., *Selections*, II, 238; *Transcript*, October 5, 1906; *Herald*, October 6, 1906.

port of those discontented voters who could find no adequate means to express their opposition to the Lodge-Crane organization within the Republican Party. Foss picked the right year to change parties, for 1909 marked the beginning of a reversal in the fortunes of the G.O.P. in Massachusetts. While Draper defeated James H. Vahey for the top post, the Governor's plurality of 60,000 in 1908 was reduced to a mere 8,000. Foss showed real strength in coming within 8,000 of Lieutenant-Governor Frothingham, whereas in the previous election the Democratic candidate had lost by over 96,000 votes.

Republican leaders attributed this decline to the popular concern over the rising cost of living.¹³ Naturally the Democrats blamed the tariff for the price increases, and in 1909 this approach seemed to be politically effective. Certainly this issue was made to order for Foss, with his long record of agitation for tariff reform. Senator Lodge, apprehensive, wrote to Theodore Roosevelt:

I feel anything but easy about next year. If the country continues prosperous and the prosperity increases so that wages will rise, I think we shall win; but if wages do not rise and the high prices which we cannot control continue, we are likely to lose.¹⁴

Lodge's fears proved to be far from groundless.

The events of 1910 demonstrated that the Republican Party had indeed become decidedly vulnerable in Massachusetts. Alarming symptoms of insurgency developed in the state committee and General Court as more and more Republicans became impatient with the standpattism of the old guard. This rising discontent helped to catapult Foss to political prominence. On March 22, a special election was called to fill a vacancy in the fourteenth congressional district, an area that included all of Barnstable County and Cape Cod, most of Plymouth County, and a few adjacent communities in Bristol and Norfolk Counties. The previous incumbent, William C. Lovering, had died on February 4. A member of Congress since 1897, Lovering had gained a reputation as an insurgent because of his association with those congressmen

¹³ G. von L. Meyer to Lodge, November 3, 1909; Draper to Meyer, November 4, 1909; Lodge to Meyer, November 7, 1909, Lodge Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society. On the increased living costs see Massachusetts: General Court, *Report of the Commission on the Cost of Living*, House Doc. No. 1750, May, 1910.

¹⁴ Lodge to Roosevelt, November 30, 1909, in Lodge, ed., *Selections*, II, 354.

planning the overthrow of Speaker Joe Cannon.¹⁵ In 1908 the popular congressman had been re-elected by a vote three times that received by his Democratic opponent. Naturally the Republican organization assumed that this district was solidly behind the G.O.P.

Events soon proved that the Republicans were badly mistaken. Pleased by Foss's showing in the 1909 election, the Democrats selected him as their candidate. Foss immediately made it clear that he intended to make insurgency the chief issue. He praised Lovering for his stand on Cannon, and identified his Republican opponent, William A. Buchanan of Brockton, with standpattism. Stressing the high cost of living, Foss called for better trade relations with America's neighbors, the free entry of raw materials, and reciprocity with Canada. He also championed the income tax and conservation measures, while denouncing "Aldrich-Cannonism and all that it implies."¹⁶ Thus, to some extent the contest was a test of changing popular sentiment on such broader national issues as insurgency and tariff policy.

Virtually no one predicted other than a Republican victory, with only the size of the majority in doubt. But the political prophets were badly mistaken. Foss not only won, but he did so by a majority of nearly 6,000. Thousands of Republicans had deserted their party.¹⁷ Some Republicans attempted to explain away this disaster as the product of local issues, and especially as a rejection of Buchanan personally. Certainly Buchanan was not favored by a number of Republicans in the district, particularly those who had promoted the nomination of Judge Robert O. Harris of East Bridgewater.¹⁸ But to write off this dramatic reversal in political fortunes simply in terms of personalities was fatuous. Clearly the election was an emphatic rebuke of existing Republican policies. Within this district, which subsequently became the section of Massachusetts most strongly supporting the Progressive Party, the belief was widespread that Lodge and the Republican

¹⁵ George Henry Payne, *The Birth of the New Party*, n.p., 1912, 116-117; *Boston Daily Advertiser*, February 14, 1910.

¹⁶ *Boston Transcript*, March 11, 1910; *Boston Advertiser*, March 15, 1910. For relation of reciprocity issue to this special election see L. Nathan Ellis, *Reciprocity 1911, A Study in Canadian-American Relations*, New Haven, 1939, 15.

¹⁷ The vote was Foss: 15,086, Buchanan: 9,469. In 1908 the vote had been Democratic: 6,709, Republican: 20,959.

¹⁸ *Boston Transcript*, *Boston Advertiser*, *Christian Science Monitor*, March 23, 1910; Draper to Lodge, April 20, 1910, Lodge Papers.

Party had not served the area well in regard to the tariff.¹⁹ Possibly the dissatisfaction of the shoe manufacturers over unfavorable duties on hides was one source of the insurgency. But Foss had also carried nearly all of the traditionally Republican small towns as well as the few cities of the district. Distrust of the old guard went beyond the problem of tariff. At the same time probably most of the voters did not want to shift their allegiance permanently to the Democrats. Conveniently enough, the special election did not involve control of the state, and Foss, as a former Republican insurgent, who was not yet associated with the urban Democratic bosses, was an attractive candidate. The situation was ideal for an expression of no confidence by Republicans in their party's leadership.

Foss's service as Congressman was brief and undistinguished. He delivered only one real speech, an effort on behalf of tariff reform, but his interest was in state politics rather than in Congress. As a result of the special election his political stock had risen dramatically. In January, 1911, Senator Lodge had to stand for reelection. If Foss played his cards correctly the possibility existed that he could strike a blow at his old enemy.

In January, 1910, Congressman Butler Ames of Lowell began a campaign to unseat Lodge. Ames did not attract much support, and Lodge felt that he was not in great danger. After the special congressional election, however, the Senator began to take a more serious view of the situation. "The times are troubled," he told Roosevelt, "and a narrow margin in the Legislature might open the door for Foss and his money."²⁰ To insure his own reelection, Lodge had to prevent the mounting insurgency from actually crystallizing into a solid progressive faction. On the other hand, the success of his opponents depended in large measure on the ability of the Democrats to keep their divergent factions together, while presenting a program and ticket in the November election that was sufficiently progressive to attract the discontented Republicans. Fortified by his recent triumph, Foss appeared to be well suited to lead the Democratic attack.

¹⁹ A poll of 17 Republican editors in this district disclosed that 16 had expressed disapproval of the tariff. See "The Election of Mr. Foss," *Independent*, LXVIII (March 31, 1910), 709-710. The editor of the *Wareham Courier* maintained that the district was still basically Republican, but that the tariff was exceedingly unpopular and that it was necessary to punish the Republican Party for drifting away from the people. See *La Follette's Weekly Magazine*, II (May 14, 1910), 9.

²⁰ Lodge to Roosevelt, April 19, 1910, Lodge Papers.

With so many clear indications of Republican decline, interest naturally rose in the Democratic gubernatorial nomination. James H. Vahey, who had led the ticket in 1909, was the first to declare his candidacy. Later both Mayor John F. Fitzgerald of Boston and Charles S. Hamlin announced that they were quite willing to accept the nomination, although they were not actively working for it.²¹ Foss remained noncommittal throughout the summer, but he had important supporters. Chairman MacLeod of the state committee began to pressure Vahey to withdraw in favor of Foss, on the grounds that Foss would be more likely to attract Republican votes.²² Many Democrats were also frankly impressed by his wealth. As former Governor Douglas noted to Hamlin, Foss "would make an enormous contribution" to the campaign.²³ By the time of the convention Foss had the backing of many important Democratic leaders.

Nevertheless, the Foss forces did not control a majority of the delegates at the state convention held at Faneuil Hall in Boston on October 6. The battle between Vahey and Foss resulted in a deadlock. In order to file the notice of nomination by 5:00 p.m., October 7, which was believed to be the deadline, the Vahey and Foss leaders finally agreed to a novel proposal. They selected Frederick W. Mansfield as a compromise candidate, but only for purposes of filing nomination papers. It was understood that Mansfield was only a dummy, who would resign within 72 hours. Another candidate would subsequently be chosen by a committee of four, which was appointed specially for the task of filling the vacancy. In short, this committee was empowered to make the real nomination.²⁴

Incredibly, neither the Vahey nor the Foss men had interpreted the election law correctly, for it was subsequently pointed out that certificates of nomination did not have to be filed until October 10. There had been plenty of time to reconvene the convention

²¹ *Boston Herald*, August 23 and September 4, 1910.

²² See report of discussion between Hamlin and MacLeod in the Diary of Charles S. Hamlin, August 15, 1910, Hamlin Papers, Library of Congress. MacLeod did not declare publicly for Foss until October 2, just prior to the state convention. *Boston Herald*, October 3, 1910.

Martin Lomasney, boss of Boston's Ward 8, was another important Democrat who threw his support to Foss just before the convention. See A. D. Van Nostrand, "The Lomasney Legend," *New England Quarterly*, XXI (December, 1948), 449; Leslie G. Ainley, *Boston Mahatma*, Boston, 1949, 110-112.

²³ Hamlin Diary, August 21, 1910.

²⁴ *Boston Herald* and *Boston Transcript*, October 7, 1910.

for further balloting. To make matters worse, the special committee of four was quite unable to reach a decision, and Mansfield, who would not be legally compelled to resign, even threatened to remain on the ticket if Foss were selected.²⁵ Finally the Democratic State Committee agreed to break the deadlock by having the regularly elected delegates to the convention mail in their preferences for governor. The committee of four promised to select a candidate on the basis of the results of this mail-order ballot. On October 17, the committee announced that Foss had beaten Vahey by eleven votes. Two days later Mansfield withdrew, and Foss was duly substituted as the Democratic gubernatorial nominee. Taking no chances, Foss in the meantime had filed independent nomination papers as a "Democratic Progressive." Hence his name ultimately appeared on the ballot under two designations.²⁶

Despite the struggles over the gubernatorial nomination, the prospects for a Democratic victory in 1910 seemed better than in years. The Democrats capitalized on the growing interest in reform. Their platform, noted the *Springfield Republican*, was "sharp, ringing and progressive. It places the Republicans badly on the defensive. . . ."²⁷ Whereas the G.O.P. program was vague and equivocal, the Democratic was unusually clear and specific. It blamed high living costs on the tariff and demanded removal of duties on food-stuffs and necessities. In addition it called for an impressive list of reforms including: the federal income tax amendment, the direct election of United States senators, initiative and referendum, direct primaries, an effective workingmen's compensation law, an eight-hour law for employees on public projects, and several other proposals of this nature.²⁸ If platforms could be taken seriously, the Democrats presented a real alternative to the Republicans.

As standard-bearer Foss had several advantages, not the least of which was his long record as an opponent of Senator Lodge and a champion of tariff reform. During the campaign he concentrated on these points and led the Democratic Party to its first gubernatorial victory since 1904. Foss received the second largest Democratic vote in Massachusetts history. While the Republicans carried the other state offices, they did so by greatly reduced mar-

²⁵ *Boston Herald*, October 8 and 12, 1910.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, October 13, 16 and 18, 1910; *Boston Transcript*, October 17 and 19, 1910.

²⁷ *Springfield Republican*, October 7, 1910.

²⁸ *Boston Herald*, October 7, 1910.

gins. Fortunately for Lodge, the Republicans retained control of the General Court. However, they lost 42 seats in the House and 6 in the Senate. Their margin over the Democrats would be only 17 in the new House and 12 in the Senate, or a total of only 29 on a combined ballot. This was still potentially very dangerous for Lodge, for if the Democrats held firm on a joint ballot, while picking up a minimum of 15 insurgent votes, they could block the Senator's re-election.

Foss and most Democrats interpreted the election as a vote of no confidence in Senator Lodge. Certainly the Senator had become more and more the object of attack, not only by Democrats but by dissatisfied Republicans as well. In all probability Lodge was a liability to his party in the November election. For example, in the third congressional district the Republican incumbent, Charles G. Washburn, was defeated by a virtually unknown Democrat, John A. Thayer. Local sentiment placed the blame for Washburn's and Draper's defeat squarely on Lodge's shoulders. "It was clearly a case," proclaimed the *Worcester Evening Gazette*, "where the voters shot their arrows over the House to hit Lodge. . . . [He] is a millstone on the neck of the party and should be allowed to retire as gracefully as may be. The party cannot carry him longer."²⁹ Given such hostility within his own party and a new General Court with only a slim Republican majority, it was clear that Lodge faced the fight of his life to retain his seat in the Senate.

The Governor-elect spearheaded the attack against Senator Lodge with the belligerent assertion:

I shall never sign his credentials except at the end of a campaign which will make the last one look like an afternoon tea party. He must surrender or fight. He must defend his position before the people. The people of Massachusetts will not permit him longer to manipulate the Legislature. I am ready, and if he does not retire, will be on the stump in every section of the state, and we will find out where the people stand.³⁰

Foss kept his attack in high gear throughout December and into January, but despite the severity of his language, his campaign was weakened by its excessively negative character. It was not enough to assert that Lodge should not be re-elected; Foss had to promote someone who was better qualified. Yet he did not

²⁹ *Worcester Evening Gazette*, November 9, 1910, quoted in George H. Haynes, *The Life of Charles G. Washburn*, Boston, 1931, 112-113.

³⁰ *Boston Herald*, November 21, 1910,

seriously concern himself with finding a candidate who could win the support of both the Democrats and the insurgent Republicans, even though the joint efforts of both were necessary to defeat Lodge. By December the only Democrats to announce their candidacies were Colonel William A. Gaston and Congressman Joseph F. O'Connell, while Congressman Ames was the only declared Republican. But none of these men had an enthusiastic following.³¹ Not until January 16 did the Democrats agree on their candidate, and he proved to have little attraction to the Republican insurgents.

Quite likely Foss's public campaigning backfired. For example, Charles Francis Adams, a man who had displayed little political sympathy for Lodge in the past, wrote that he was so tired and disgusted by "the Gyrations, Pronunciamentoes and Proclamations of our extraordinary Governor-elect..." that he would do anything in his power to assist the Senator's re-election.³² On December 21, Gaston withdrew his candidacy on the ground that Foss's tactics had made his own election impossible.³³ Two weeks later another prominent Democrat, Henry M. Whitney, a gubernatorial candidate in 1907, went even further and declared for Lodge.³⁴

As the time for the election drew near, it was clear that Foss had failed to consolidate the opposition. Yet he continued to campaign until nearly the last minute. Thus, in his inaugural address delivered on January 5, Foss repeated his belief that the November election was a popular mandate against Lodge. Still, at that stage it was doubtful that the new governor influenced many legislators. In noting the breach of traditional amenities in the inaugural address, Speaker of the House Joseph Walker observed that "the House has got into a frame of mind where they expect anything from Governor Foss, and they do not take him very seriously."³⁵

³¹ *Boston Transcript*, November 21 and December 22, 1910; *Herald*, November 23 and December 22, 1910.

³² Charles F. Adams to Lodge, November 25, 1910, Lodge Papers.

³³ *Boston Herald*, December 22, 1910. Lodge noted: "Foss has completely queered Gaston's campaign and I do not wonder that he is angry.... If the Democrats are all loose it ought to help us." Lodge to Norman White, December 23, 1910, Lodge Papers. See also Lodge to Allen Treadway, December 24, 1910, and Charles S. Groves to Lodge, December 27, 1910, Lodge Papers.

³⁴ *Boston Herald*, January 3, 1911. On Whitney see Robert L. O'Brien to Lodge, January 1, 1911, Lodge Papers, and Frank B. Tracy to Roosevelt, January 3, 1911, Roosevelt Papers, Library of Congress. Tracy, the editor of the *Boston Transcript*, insisted that Whitney was primarily motivated by his hatred of Foss.

³⁵ Walker to Lodge, January 9, 1911, Lodge Papers; *Boston Herald*, January 6, 1911.

Lodge owed his ultimate re-election on January 18, 1911, to his own meticulous planning as well as to the reaction against Foss. Thus, the Senator's managers carefully cultivated the support of any doubtful members of the General Court.³⁶ In addition, his long-term efforts to maintain party unity in the face of increased progressive sentiment paid off. No organized block of Republican insurgents campaigned against Lodge, while such prominent Republicans as Robert Luce, Joseph Walker, and Norman White, all known for their independence and reform inclinations, were his loyal supporters.³⁷ As for the "progressive Republicans in the rank and file..." observed Congressman Gardner, "of course, Mr. Lodge doesn't satisfy them; but, on the other hand, he doesn't disastisfy [sic] them enough to stir them into activity and they seem to feel that they might fare worse after all."³⁸ Nevertheless, the contest was close. Lodge failed to get a majority, in the House, and he was victorious only after the election was transferred to a joint session in which a simple majority of all votes was required. Had there been an opponent satisfactory to both Republican insurgents and Democrats, the outcome might well have been otherwise.

If Foss had failed to destroy his enemy, at least he had given the Lodge machine a serious scare, and in the process his name had become far better known. Clearly the discontent in 1910 had turned out to be very convenient for Foss's political career. Many of his critics, indeed, assumed that Foss was far more concerned with his own political advancement than with a real desire for reform. At any rate, Foss had become a highly controversial figure. It certainly was questionable whether he could provide the leadership which was necessary to enact a reform program, for success depended upon uniting most Democrats with the liberal Republicans in the General Court.

Few previous governors of Massachusetts were as active as Foss, who for three years kept the politicians and public busy trying to guess his next move. Prior to his governorship his primary interests had been in tariff reform or in attacking Senator Lodge. In his first inaugural message, however, Foss shocked conserva-

³⁶ See files "Senate Contest, 1910-1911," in Lodge Papers.

³⁷ For a more extended analysis of the Lodge Campaign see Richard B. Sherman, "Progressive Politics in Massachusetts; 1908-1916," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 79-89, and Garraty, *Lodge*, 273-284.

³⁸ Gardner to Roosevelt, December 31, 1910, Roosevelt Papers.

tives by calling for one of the most extensive reform programs in state history.

We have reached a crisis in the affairs of this commonwealth. . . . The dictatorship by political bosses and by representatives of special interests is hotly resented. . . . This usurpation of power can only be ended by the people taking into their own hands the direction and control of their government.

The first step is to abolish the boss and all his agencies; the caucus, the nominating convention and all political machinery which intervenes between the people and their government.³⁹

Specifically Foss asked for such political reforms as: direct primary nominations for all elective offices, recall of public servants, initiative and referendum, reduction of election expenditures with the state providing meeting halls for parties and publishing election literature, redistribution of legislative districts, and home rule for cities. But he did not stop there. For labor's benefit Foss recommended protection of the right to organize, restriction on unfair injunctions, limitation of hours of labor (especially for women and children), compensation for injuries, and vocational training for the youth of the state. In addition he called for expenditures to improve the Port of Boston, higher judicial salaries, a number of administrative reforms, a state income tax, and the federal income tax amendment.

"Foss would reform all," complained the *Boston Advertiser*, which saw no difference between his ideas and those of the socialists.⁴⁰ The businesslike *Boston Herald* predicted that if Foss's proposals were adopted, they "would swamp the state in new expenditures."⁴¹ But reformers took a different view. The progressive weekly, *Boston Common*, concluded that the movement "toward fundamental democracy, toward equality of privileges and opportunities before the law, has received new life and hope. . . ."⁴² Regardless of Foss's motives, and hostile critics did question his true interest in many of the proposals, the new governor had aroused the complacent. It was an unusual sight for a governor of Massachusetts to assume the role of progressive leader.

The 1911 session was the longest on record. While the legislators ignored a large part of Foss's program, they could boast of

³⁹ *Boston Herald*, January 6, 1911.

⁴⁰ January 6, 1911.

⁴¹ January 6, 1911.

⁴² January 14, 1911.

a number of significant measures. Thus, after years of agitation and partial measures, a general direct primary law was finally enacted. Most of the other political reforms failed, but a number of labor measures were passed. A commission was created to study the possibility of establishing a minimum wage for women and children. The recommendation of this commission led to the enactment in 1912 of the first minimum wage law in the United States. Massachusetts also became in 1911 one of the first states to enact a workingman's compensation law. Participation in the compensation system was elective, not compulsory, but it provided many workers with far better protection than they had found under the rigors of the modified common law interpretation of employers' liability. Another measure cut the maximum hours from 56 to 54 for women and children under eighteen years employed in manufacturing or mercantile establishments. At first Foss favored a 55-hour law, but under pressure from labor he finally consented to the more liberal measure.

Although the Republicans had a majority in the General Court during all three terms of Foss's governorship, support for most reforms was bipartisan, with the Democrats supplying the largest number of votes. A study of the voting records on eleven progressive political or social measures in 1911 indicated that they were favored by 81 percent of the Democratic legislators, but by only 28 percent of the Republicans.⁴³ Enthusiasm for reform was limited to a fairly small minority within the G.O.P. Thus the progressive elements in both parties had to cooperate to be successful in the legislature.

Although Foss presented his most extensive proposals in his first inaugural address, he repeated many of these ideas in later messages, and never was he without a cause.⁴⁴ In addition to the political and social reforms already noted, Foss had a particular interest in reorganizing and consolidating the large number of boards and commissions that cluttered up the government of Massachusetts. Such boards, he insisted, had been largely used as a source of patronage.⁴⁵ In his 1912 and 1913 inaugural messages,

⁴³ *Boston Common*, August 12, 1911.

⁴⁴ Note, for example, his numerous special messages or his second inaugural address. See also *Workingmen's Compensation. The New Massachusetts Law and the Need of Uniform Legislation on this Subject in Other States*. Address by Eugene Noble Foss at Governors' Conference, Spring Lake, N. J., September 13, 1911, Pamphlet in Massachusetts State Library.

⁴⁵ Charles Johnston, "A Talk with Governor Foss," *Harper's Weekly*, LV (September 2, 1911), 7.

Foss devoted more attention to the problem of the New Haven Railroad's attempted monopoly of New England transportation. He recommended dissolution of the Boston Holding Company, the device by which the New Haven controlled the Boston and Maine, and the creation of a powerful public service commission with mandatory regulatory powers over transportation facilities.⁴⁶ Prison reform was another interest. In 1912 he demanded the abolition of the archaic Charlestown prison, its replacement by a modern institution, and the payment of prisoners for their work at full value.⁴⁷ And, of course, at nearly every opportunity he continued to put in a plea for tariff reform and reciprocity agreements.

In terms of bills enacted, probably more was accomplished in 1911 than in any other year, but the second two years of Foss's governorship did witness some significant new measures. The most important political reform in 1912 was the presidential preference primary law. The driving force behind this bill came from the Roosevelt Republicans, but Foss and a large number of Democrats gave it their support. In 1913 the Progressive Party, through its Legislative Bureau, took the initiative in drafting and introducing political and social reforms. By that time Foss's interest in many progressive measures had decidedly slackened. Nevertheless, some of his earlier recommendations were now enacted. For example, the General Court passed for the required second year a referendum amendment providing that measures could be submitted to the electorate for approval or rejection. This amendment was overwhelmingly accepted by the voters in the November election. An initiative proposal failed, but a public opinion law was enacted to allow voters in senatorial or representative districts to render advisory opinions on duly propounded questions.

Foss's three years as Governor coincided with the height of the progressive movement in Massachusetts. Standing as an opponent of bossism and a champion of reform, Foss had certainly capitalized on the widespread interest in progressivism. Yet if his tactics occasionally suggested political opportunism, he did at least assist the enactment of several notable reforms. None of his more conventional Republican predecessors could claim anywhere near

⁴⁶ *Boston Herald*, January 5, 1912 and January 3, 1913.

⁴⁷ *Boston Herald*, January 5, 1912. See also Eugene N. Foss, "Reform Through Labor," *American Academy of Political and Social Science, Annals*, XLVI (March, 1913), 35-39; Eugene N. Foss, "The Ideal Prison System," *Journal of the American Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology*, IV, (January, 1914), 674-686.

as much. Nor was it true in every case that he took up reform only when an election was at hand. His fight for reciprocity was certainly a continuing one, and he kept up an interest in prison reform long after his third election as governor. Granted all this, the fact remains that progressives of all parties did not entirely trust Foss. The *Boston Common* concluded:

He has been shift and uncertain. What he says at one time affords little light as to what he may subsequently be expected to do. He is something of a bluffer, a good deal of a politician and always a 'jollier.' He is not a constructive statesman.⁴⁸

Certainly Foss had political ambitions. After his re-election in 1911, his name was frequently mentioned as a vice-presidential or even presidential candidate. Foss did little to discourage such speculation. The fact that he devoted half of his inaugural message on January 4, 1912, to national issues was interpreted as an obvious bid for the White House.⁴⁹ In the spring of 1912 Foss planned to enter the presidential preference primary, but finally withdrew when he failed to win the support of the Democratic State Committee. Nearly all of the important organization Democrats in Massachusetts favored Champ Clark.⁵⁰ As a result, the Foss boom never got off the ground.

The turnout for the Democratic presidential primary was light, but the trend was clear. Clark received over twice as many preference votes as did Wilson. Twenty-one of the delegates were pledged to Clark, fifteen to Foss and none to Wilson. Foss immediately announced that he was releasing his delegates from their pledges. Yet he had not abandoned all hope, for he remained available as a compromise candidate in the event of a protracted deadlock at Baltimore. At the convention he distributed pamphlets entitled, "Foss, the Only Democrat Who Can Win." But the Democratic leaders received him coldly. Nearly all of the Massachusetts delegates voted consistently for Clark until his chances began to

⁴⁸ *Boston Common*, November 2, 1912. It should be noted that this journal was at the same time highly sympathetic to Wilson.

⁴⁹ *Boston Transcript*, January 4, 1912; *Boston Herald*, January 5, 1912.

⁵⁰ *Boston Transcript*, April 5, 1912; *Boston Advertiser*, March 29, 1912; *Boston Herald*, April 3-5, 1912; Arthur S. Link, *Wilson: The Road to the White House*, Princeton, N. J., 1947, 381-382, 419-420 note. Wilson was vulnerable in Massachusetts because of the conservative anti-Populist, anti-union and anti-foreign attitude in his *History of the American People*. George Fred Williams, the old radical Democrat, had called attention to this issue in a letter published in the *New York Times*, February 2, 1912.

fade. Only then did they shift to Foss, for whom they voted fruitlessly until Wilson's nomination was assured.⁵¹

With his presidential aspirations thwarted, Foss's interest in state politics began to revive. Ordinarily after two successful elections, a governor could readily count on a third nomination, but in 1912 Foss's hesitation aided his enemies. Several times before the Baltimore convention he had been quoted as saying he would not run again. Joseph A. Pelletier, the District Attorney of Suffolk County, rushed into the gap with his own bid for the nomination.⁵² In what became a hot battle for control of Boston, Pelletier was supported by James M. Curley, who hoped to destroy the power of the Foss-backers, Mayor Fitzgerald and Martin Lomasney.⁵³ Another threat developed in mid-July, when David I. Walsh, the successful candidate for lieutenant-governor in 1911, told Foss that he, too, would seek the nomination unless he immediately declared his intention to run. On July 15, Foss finally announced his candidacy, and he soon received the support of Fitzgerald, the Boston Democratic City Committee and Chairman Riley of the State Committee. Not until mid-September, however, did Walsh, who reconciled himself to another try for the second position, endorse Governor Foss.⁵⁴

The battle between the Foss and Pelletier forces was a bitter one, but with the power of the state machine behind Foss, his victory at the September 24 primary was no surprise. By that time, however, Foss's credentials as a progressive spokesman were highly questionable. In 1910 and 1911 he had undoubtedly won the support of some liberal Republican and independent voters, but he had failed to unite Massachusetts progressives. Foss's position in the Democratic Party had become all too obviously dependent upon the aid of such Boston politicians as Fitzgerald and Lomasney, men whose names were anathema to most of the reform element. Furthermore, Foss's political aspirations in 1912 gave some basis to

⁵¹ Michael E. Hennessy, *Twenty-Five Years of Massachusetts Politics: 1890-1915*, Boston, 1917, 293-294; Frank Hendrick, *Why Eugene N. Foss Should be Nominated For President and Elected*, n.p., 1912, pamphlet in Roosevelt Memorial Association Collection, Widener Library, Harvard University; *Official Report of the Proceedings of the Democratic National Convention*, 1912, 197ff.

⁵² *Boston Advertiser*, June 3, 1912; *Boston Herald*, July 5 and 16, 1912.

⁵³ *Boston Herald*, July 18 and August 27, 1912; *Boston Transcript*, August 27, 1912; Hennessy, *Twenty-Five Years*, 303-306; Joseph F. Dinneen, *The Purple Shamrock*, New York, 1949, 93-105; Leslie G. Ainley, *Boston Mahatma*, Boston, 1949, 122-125.

⁵⁴ *Boston Transcript*, July 15, 1912; *Boston Herald*, July 18, August 7, September 11 and 16, 1912; *Boston American*, September 17, 1912.

the charge that his main interest was in personal advancement, not progressive legislation. Finally, of course, Foss faced a well organized Bull Moose Party in 1912. Progressive voters could choose between him and Charles Sumner Bird on the gubernatorial level, and between Roosevelt and Wilson on the presidential.

While progressives were politically split in 1912, the presence of the third party did aid the Democrats. Foss's vote was well below his 1910 and 1911 total. Yet thanks to the division in Republican ranks, he was easily returned for a third term, accompanied now by a David I. Walsh as lieutenant-governor and a Democratic secretary of state.

Foss had won the distinction of becoming the first Democrat in Massachusetts history to be elected governor three consecutive times. But during his third term his alliance with the Democratic Party was severely strained and ultimately broken. His political power rapidly evaporated. Foss had been useful to the Democratic leaders. When insurgency had been at its height, he had been a moderately good vote-getter as a champion of progressive causes. Unhappily, Foss had not constructed an organization of his own, either within the Democratic Party or as a broader progressive coalition. In 1910 his outspoken independence was an attractive feature for an opponent of bossism; by 1913 this same characteristic led to his isolation as a political maverick.

Possibly Foss hoped that Wilson would appoint him to some national position. No such reward was forthcoming. His chances for another Democratic gubernatorial nomination in 1913 were very slight now that he was serving the traditional maximum of three terms. By mid-1913 it appeared obvious that Foss was losing interest in progressivism and the Democratic Party. He attacked the Wilson administration for proposing a reckless and indiscriminate lowering of the tariff, rather than carefully balanced reciprocity agreements.⁵⁵ Increasingly he ignored the suggestions of local Democratic leaders and appointed Republicans to state jobs.⁵⁶ In July,

⁵⁵ Eugene N. Foss, "Reciprocity, the Solution to our Tariff Problem," *Hearst's Magazine*, XXIV, (September, 1913), 405-407.

In July Foss announced that he planned to remove part of his machinery works from Massachusetts to Canada. He asserted that this removal was necessary because of the tariff action of the Democratic Congress and the local "arbitrary and tyrannical" labor leaders. See, "Retreat of a Foss Industry," *Literary Digest*, XLVII (July 26, 1913), 122.

⁵⁶ Thomas P. Riley to James E. Handrahan, February 17, 1914, Walsh Papers, Dinand Library, College of the Holy Cross, Worcester, Mass. Riley, Chairman of the Democratic State Committee, said the matter of appointments was the chief reason for his break with Foss.

It should be noted, however, that earlier even Foss's opponents ad-

David I. Walsh, supported by Chairman Riley and the state organization, announced his candidacy for the gubernatorial nomination. Shortly afterwards Foss began negotiations with G.O.P. leaders.⁵⁷ He held a number of talks with Republican Chairman Hatfield, and then stated his intention to file nomination papers as a Republican. In August, Foss explained to an incredulous public that he had never left the Republican Party. Rather, he claimed, it had left him, while his own record had been consistent in terms of the policies he had advocated. For all his troubles, however, Foss failed to collect the requisite number of signatures for his name to appear on the Republican primary ballot.⁵⁸

Governor Eugene Noble Foss did not retire gracefully. On the last day for filing nomination papers, he entered the race as an independent candidate for governor. He had no major party support, and no chance of success. Yet he might draw enough votes to influence the outcome. With typical effrontery, Foss called upon the Republican and Progressive Party candidates to withdraw in order to prevent control of the state from being turned over to his former allies, the "Tammany trio, Thomas P. Riley, Martin Lomasney, and John F. Fitzgerald."⁵⁹ A skeptical voter might well observe that it was rather late for Foss to become concerned over the influence of these gentlemen.

The 1913 election proved to be Foss's last stand in politics. Walsh was elected governor, despite the fact that Foss drew some 20,000 votes. Foss's political career had reached land's end. Although he returned to the Republican fold, the G.O.P. had no use for his talents. In 1917 the former Governor ran unsuccessfully

mitted that his appointments had usually been good ones. Although some detractors then argued that this fact in itself proved Foss acted only to advance his political career. See, for example, *Practical Politics*, September 16, 1911, 3520.

Foss also had admirers among the Irish Catholic population in the matter of appointments. William H. Sullivan of Boston, a delegate to the Constitutional Convention, observed in the course of a debate in 1918, that "Foss appointed to the judiciary men of the Catholic faith when it required great courage, physical and moral, to do it..." *Debates in the Massachusetts Constitutional Convention: 1917-1918*, Boston, 1918-1920, I, 915.

⁵⁷ *Boston Herald*, July 16, 20 and 22, 1913. The estrangement between Walsh and Foss was due in part to the Governor's attitude toward labor. Workers at Foss's Hyde Park Sturtevant Company went on strike in July. Foss countered by denouncing the union and upholding the open shop. See Dorothy G. Wayman, *David I. Walsh: Citizen-Patriot*, Milwaukee, 1956, 46. See also, "Retreat of a Foss Industry," *Literary Digest*, XLVII (July 26, 1913), 122.

⁵⁸ *Herald*, August 9, 17, 19 and 20, 1913.

⁵⁹ Hennessy, *Twenty-Five Years*, 348; *Boston Herald*, October 28, 1913.

for delegate-at-large to the constitutional convention. Thereafter until his death in 1939, he never again sought elective office.

Foss's political career was marred by caustic charges and re-criminations. He refused to abide by the conventional rules, and he disdained party loyalty. Consequently, first the Republicans and then the Democrats belittled his intentions and minimized his accomplishments. Clearly Foss enjoyed the applause of the crowd, and he had risen to political prominence by exploiting the popular issues of insurgency and progressivism. Still it does not follow that Foss was merely a demagogue. Any politician must be ambitious and must use the issues at hand. Foss's political collapse was largely due to his failure to develop adequate institutional support for his ambitions. If anything, he was too consistently the insurgent. Despite his shortcomings, Governor Foss, with the support of urban Democratic bosses, was probably a more effective spokesman for reform than most of the insurgent Republicans or Bull Moosers in Massachusetts.

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German-Americans and Neutrality in the 1916 Election

In the period between the outbreak of World War I in August, 1914 and the entry of the United States into the conflict in April, 1917, the major objectives of German propaganda in the United States were: (1) to prevent the shipment of munitions and supplies to the Allies; (2) to keep the United States from entering the war as an ally of France and England; (3) to maintain a solidarity of the German immigrants and pro-German elements in the United States behind the cause of the Central Powers.¹ Ultimately all of these objectives failed. Plots and conspiracies to block munitions and supply shipments involving German representatives violated American laws and neutrality, thus contributing to the ineffectiveness of Berlin's propaganda.² This propaganda, combined with German attempts to exercise political influence, failed to keep the United States out of the war and failed to create solidarity among pro-German elements. Instead such activities created a distrust of Germany in the minds of many Americans and, more significantly, in the minds of important members of President Woodrow Wilson's Administration.³

One of the best examples of how German political and propagandist efforts among the German-Americans backfired occurred in the election of 1916. While Berlin's representatives in the United States did not actively engage in politics themselves, they did support groups and individuals who were attempting to defeat President Wilson with the hope of electing an administration more favorable to the Central Powers. In some cases the efforts of German-American and Irish-American leaders, with whom the

¹ Subcommittee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, *Brewing and Liquor Interests and German and Bolshevik Propaganda*, 66 Cong., 1 sess., Senate Document No. 61, Washington, 1919, 7.

² The course and effect of the plots and similar activities are traced in Thomas J. Kerr, IV, "German Attempts to Influence American Neutrality 1914-1917: A study of the Role of German Diplomatic Officials in Propaganda, Plots, and Political Activities in the United States." M.A. thesis, University of Buffalo, February 1959, 73-116.

³ This thesis is summarized more fully in *ibid.*, 160-175. The best analysis of German propaganda and its failure to appeal to German immigrants is found in Felice A. Bonadio, "The Failure of German Propaganda in the United States, 1914-1917," *MID-AMERICA*, XLI (January, 1959), 40-57. Bonadio contends, "... the ultimate failure of German propaganda was the failure to recognize the influence of the American 'melting pot' and its ability to assimilate the one into many."

Germans had been working, clearly went farther than the German Ambassador, Johann von Bernstorff, desired. The result of these efforts was not the defeat of Wilson, but, indirectly, a blow to Berlin.

Before the Democratic and Republican conventions in June, 1916, the leaders of the Teutonic element were already lining up on the Republican side, hoping to influence the "Grand Old Party's" choice for the presidential nomination. The professional German-Americans, those leading German propaganda and German-American organizations, felt that this represented their best chance to defeat the "pro-British" President whom, with increasing animosity, they had opposed on nearly every international issue for more than a year.⁴ In mid-1915 the *Fatherland*, a weekly English language periodical run by George Sylvester Viereck, a paid agent of the German government,⁵ conducted a poll among 208 German-American papers. This poll indicated that Wilson had lost 92 percent of the German vote because of his unneutral attitude.⁶

While there had been some preconvention talk among German-Americans of supporting Champ Clark for the Democratic nomination, it was soon a foregone conclusion that opposition to Wilson was futile.⁷ In the Republican camp the Germans were particularly anxious to block Theodore Roosevelt's bid for nomination. T. R. had become strongly anti-German soon after the outbreak of European hostilities, and the hyphenate leaders felt that even Wilson was preferable to the vituperative "Rough Rider." Thus, they quickly lined up behind Charles Evans Hughes, Associate Justice of the Supreme Court and the strongest contender for the nomination.⁸

⁴ Clifton J. Child, *The German-Americans in Politics 1914-1917*, Madison, Wisconsin, 1939, 43, 64-65, 70.

⁵ Frederic L. Paxson, *American Democracy and the World War*, 3 vols., Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1936, I, 270. For Viereck's own account of his propaganda activities see George Sylvester Viereck, *Spreading Germs of Hate*, New York, 1930.

⁶ *Fatherland*, II (May 26, 1915), 9.

⁷ "Teuton Lobby in Congress," *Literary Digest*, LII (March 18, 1916), 699.

⁸ Child, *German-Americans in Politics*, 113-114. For a description of the development of Roosevelt's animosity toward the German-Americans see Russell Buchanan, "Theodore Roosevelt and American Neutrality, 1914-1917," *American Historical Review*, XLIII (July, 1938), 775-790. For examples of how the German-Americans reciprocated in this animosity see the *Fatherland*, I (November 11, 1914), 8; II (May 26, 1915), 7; III (December 29, 1915), 370; IV (June 14, 1916), 298. Roosevelt felt the German-Americans supported Hughes because it was the only way to beat him; Roosevelt to Herbert W. Packard, September 2, 1916, quoted in Elting E. Morison, et. al., eds., *Letters of Theodore Roosevelt*, 8 vols., Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1951-1954, VIII, 1111-1112.

Many of the organizations infiltrated with Berlin's hirelings attempted to influence the conventions. The American Embargo Conference, a group formed in 1915 with branches in many states, had direct connections with members of the German Embassy and was receiving financial support from it. Some of its funds were to be used to influence the selection of delegates to the national conventions in 1916.⁹ Just before the election the Embargo Conference merged with another German-backed group, The American Independence Conference, in an effort to secure the election of Hughes.¹⁰

While the national charter of the German-American Alliance, the most powerful German-American organization in the country since its formation in 1901, prohibited political participation, state and local branches faced no such obstacle.¹¹ The Wisconsin Alliance had conceived a plan to dominate the Republican convention, but this proved impractical. Instead, a conference attended by representatives of twenty-five state alliances and sixty agents of the German-American press was held in Chicago in May, 1916, to consider how best to influence the Republican choice. Little action was taken, but local and state alliances did send petitions to the convention opposing the nomination of T. R. and the confirmed Anglophile, Elihu Root, who had been Roosevelt's Secretary of State.¹²

When Hughes was chosen by the Republicans there was rejoicing in hyphenate circles, and, whether the bewhiskered Justice liked it or not, he became the candidate of the professional German-Americans.¹³ Interestingly, in 1908 the German-Americans in New York had opposed Hughes' bid for two more years in the governor's mansion because of his strict enforcement of blue laws.¹⁴

⁹ Subcommittee on the Judiciary, *Senate Document* No. 61, 18-20; and Subcommittee on the Judiciary, *Brewing and Liquor Interests and German and Bolshevik Propaganda*, 66 Cong., 1 sess., *Senate Document* No. 62, 3 vols., Washington, 1919, II, 1495.

¹⁰ *New York Times*, October 11, 1917.

¹¹ For a description of the formation and composition of the Alliance see Child, *German-Americans in Politics*, 2-5; and Albert B. Faust, *The German Element in the United States with Special Reference to Its Political, Moral, Social, and Educational Influence*, 2 vols., Boston and New York, 1909, II, 198-199. For the article of the Alliance's constitution prohibiting participation in party politics and for its program see Rudolph Cronau, *German Achievements in America*, New York, 1916, 218-221.

¹² Child, *German-Americans in Politics*, 122-126; Carl Wittke, *German-Americans and the World War*, Columbus, Ohio, 1936, 90-91.

¹³ Arthur S. Link, *Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era 1910-1917*, New York, 1954, 232.

¹⁴ Editorial in the *Buffalo Courier*, October 29, 1908.

The fact that these people now gave him their unqualified support demonstrates that foreign policy issues, rather than domestic issues, clearly dominated their thinking in 1916.

In any case, the German-Americans could find no consolation in Democratic ranks. While the Republicans had made an appeal to the hyphenates, Wilson moved to turn their already outspoken opposition to him into a political asset. The President insisted that the keynote of his party's convention be Americanism and that a strong anti-hyphenate plank be adopted which, at least by inference, condemned the German-American Alliance and other such groups.¹⁵

Because Roosevelt was an active and bombastic campaigner for Hughes, he hurt the candidate's stature among the German element, even though it continued to support him. The German-American press almost unanimously backed Hughes, although it really was more enthusiastic in its desire to lessen the influence of T. R., who was referred to as the "Wild Man of Oyster Bay."¹⁶

State and local branches of the German-American Alliance flocked to the support of Hughes and in some areas played an active role in his campaign. Dr. Charles J. Hexamer, President of the National Alliance, threw his support to Hughes. Although Hexamer gave this endorsement as a private citizen rather than as an official of the Alliance, because of his position it had the effect of circumventing the Alliance's restriction on political activity.¹⁷

Irish and German organizations, which had been working together formally since 1907, achieved a zenith of cooperation in the political arena that far exceeded their earlier collaborations.¹⁸ This led Viereck to boast in his *Fatherland* that, "We and our Irish comrades have put the Anglomen of both parties on the defensive."¹⁹

Some of these efforts were of great concern to Ambassador Bernstorff, despite the many connections his staff had with the German-American leaders who were responsible for them. Bern-

¹⁵ Link, *Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era*, 233; Child, *German-Americans in Politics*, 144-146; Wittke, *German-Americans and the World War*, 93.

¹⁶ Child, *German-Americans in Politics*, 131-135; Wittke, *German-Americans and the World War*, 88, 94, 97, 107.

¹⁷ Child, *German-Americans in Politics*, 121, 134-135.

¹⁸ Carl F. Wittke, *The Irish in America*, Baton Rouge, Louisiana, 1956, 275-278; Wittke, *German-Americans and the World War*, 89-90.

¹⁹ *Fatherland*, V (November 8, 1916), 218.

storff was not strongly opposed to the re-election of the President, as were most of the professional German-Americans, and he found it difficult to control the anti-Wilson sentiment that his agents had aroused.²⁰ He told the President's confidant, Colonel Edward M. House, that, "... it was utterly impossible to influence in any way the rabid German-American vote; ... they had conceived the idea that the President had branded them as disloyal, and they would take their revenge by voting for Hughes."²¹ Probably the Ambassador was referring to such German-Americans as his paid propagandist, Viereck, whose *Fatherland* had been strongly anti-Wilson from an early date and remained so during most of the campaign.²² Realizing that if Wilson won, the German-Americans, because of their opposition to him, would under no circumstances be able to exert any pressure on the Administration, Bernstorff and other members of the German Embassy attempted to persuade Viereck to tone down his opposition. The editor obliged to some degree.²³

How much did the members of the Wilson Administration fear the attacks of the hyphenates? Colonel House felt that nearly all the Germans were Republicans anyway and their vote would have little effect on the election.²⁴ Secretary of State Robert Lansing, however, showed more concern. He complained that the "... attacks on the Administration reeked with vituperation, slander and falsehood."²⁵ As early as December, 1914, when he was Counselor to the State Department he had noted in a memorandum to the then Secretary of State, William Jennings Bryan, that, "Thousands of former friends of the Administration are being converted into bitter adversaries, ... by reason of the propaganda which is being carried on in an apparent effort to force the Government to adopt a policy favorable to Germany regardless of the fact that to do so would be a breach of neutrality."²⁶ Some Dem-

²⁰ Johann von Bernstorff, *My Three Years in America*, New York, 1920, 256.

²¹ Notes of House on his conference with Bernstorff, October 3, 1916, quoted in Charles Seymour, ed., *The Intimate Papers of Colonel House*, 4 vols., Boston and New York, 1926-1928, II, 372.

²² For example see *Fatherland*, IV (June 28, 1916), 330.

²³ Viereck, *Spreading Germs of Hate*, 75. See *Fatherland*, V (November 1, 1916), 202-203.

²⁴ Notes of House on conference with Ambassador Bernstorff, October 3, 1916, quoted in Seymour, *Intimate Papers of Colonel House*, II, 372.

²⁵ Robert Lansing, *War Memoirs of Robert Lansing: Secretary of State*, Indianapolis and New York, 1935, 76.

²⁶ Quoted in U. S. Department of State, *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: The Lansing Papers, 1914-1920*, 2 vols., Washington, 1939-1940, I, 184.

ocrats close to the President were so concerned that they offered to buy one million copies of the *Fatherland* on behalf of the Democratic National Committee if Viereck would print an article which asked Hughes certain leading questions. They also attempted to convince the Germanophile editor that Wilson had "kept the nation out of war."²⁷

There was no doubt where the President stood. He held steadfast in his opposition to the hyphenates, expressing contempt and distrust for a group which he was convinced was dominated by foreign governments. In a Flag Day address just prior to his re-nomination, he proclaimed:

"There is disloyalty active in the United States, and it must be absolutely crushed . . . there are those at this moment who are trying to levy a species of political blackmail, saying, 'Do what we wish in the interest of foreign sentiment or we will wreck our vengeance at the polls.'"²⁸

In his formal acceptance speech at Shadow Lawn, New Jersey, September 2 the scholarly Chief Executive continued to make political capital out of German- and Irish-American opposition to his re-election. He spoke of active foreign-born groups and combinations, declaring, "I neither seek the favour nor fear the displeasure of that small alien element amongst us which puts loyalty to any foreign power before loyalty to the United States."²⁹

In campaigning for Hughes, Roosevelt was even more abusive of the hyphenates than the President, in spite of the fact that the Republicans were generally attempting to curry the favor of this element. In a typical speech at Lewiston, Maine, on August 31 the Colonel outspokenly declared, "The citizen who endeavors to shape America's policy in the interest of the country from which he or his ancestors have sprung is no true American and has no moral right to citizenship in this country . . ." He then expressed his scorn for those who had organized in the interest of a foreign power and accused them of being guilty of "moral treason to the Republic." Emphasizing this same theme he continued, "I

²⁷ George Sylvester Viereck, *The Strangest Friendship in History: Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House*, New York, 1932, 159. Viereck, *Spreading Germs of Hate*, 241-242. Postmaster-General Albert S. Burleson was one of those who approached Viereck, see Wittke, *German-Americans in the World War*, 101-102.

²⁸ Quoted in Ray S. Baker and William E. Dodd, eds., *The Public Papers of Woodrow Wilson: The New Democracy*, 2 vols., New York, 1926, II, 207-209.

²⁹ Quoted in *ibid.*, 282-283.

condemn those professional German-Americans who in our politics act as servants and allies of Germany. . . ."³⁰

Naturally the German-Americans bitterly resented Roosevelt's attacks. The *Fatherland* was particularly vocal in expressing this resentment. The German-backed weekly countered that Roosevelt wished to see Hughes defeated in order to further his own ambitions in the Republican Party and that he was trying to do this by alienating those who were demanding "fair play" for the Central Powers. A cartoon pictured T. R. following in the footsteps of Hughes with a long knife and a tank full of poison gas speeches.³¹ Viereck lamented that every time T. R. "... opens his mouth Mr. Hughes loses 10,000 votes," and warned the candidate to repudiate the former "Rough Rider" or many of those who had been ashamed of Wilson's foreign policies might be more willing to endure them than risk an administration in which Roosevelt had influence.³² There seems to be little doubt that T. R.'s support of Hughes cost the latter some support among leading German-Americans.³³

Hughes' campaign was full of blunders and dissension as the candidate attempted to reconcile the support of two bitterly hostile groups. His refusal to take a stand on "hyphenism" enabled the Democrats to portray him as a dupe of the Kaiser in pro-British areas and as a Roosevelt-dominated jingo spoiling for war with Germany in areas with a large Teutonic population.³⁴

Before his Lewiston speech, Roosevelt had written Hughes asking for an endorsement of his vociferous denials that the Republican candidate had made any deals with the German-Americans.³⁵ Hughes replied in a telegram which was released to the press, "I heartily congratulate you on your speech at Lewiston, and

³⁰ These quotations are found in Roosevelt's speech printed in the *New York Times*, September 1, 1916. In this address Roosevelt wanted to use the phrase "members of the German-American Alliance" but was induced to substitute "professional German-Americans" by his advisers; Roosevelt to Hughes, August 28, 1916, quoted in Morison, *et. al.*, *Letters of Theodore Roosevelt*, VIII, 1108-1110.

³¹ *Fatherland*, V (October 4, 1916), 154-155.

³² *Ibid.*, V (November 1, 1916), 202-203.

³³ "The Hughes-Roosevelt Alliance," *Literary Digest*, LIII (July 8, 1916), 56.

³⁴ Wittke, *German-Americans in the World War*, 101-102; Child, *German-Americans in Politics*, 150; *New York Times*, November 4, 1916; "Progressive Leaven in the Republican Lump," *Literary Digest*, LIII (September 30, 1916), 818-819.

³⁵ Roosevelt to Hughes, August 28, 1916, quoted in Morison, *et. al.*, *Letters of Theodore Roosevelt*, VIII, 1108-1110.

warmly appreciate your effective support."³⁶ At the same time Hughes was secretly negotiating with German and Irish groups. One such group, the American Independence Conference, was a confederation which included German-backed organizations. To the leaders of the conference Hughes minimized the significance of his endorsement of the Lewiston speech.³⁷

Hughes' strongest public statement containing an appeal to these elements was made in Philadelphia on October 9. At that time he made reference to recent British activities, which had not drawn the type of strong protest from the Administration desired by the German-Americans, when he declared:

"We do not propose to tolerate any improper interference with American property, with American mails, or with legitimate commercial intercourse. No American who is exercising only American rights shall be on any blacklist by any foreign nation."³⁸

This statement received praise from the *Fatherland*.³⁹ But, it was later to cause Hughes considerable embarrassment because it was revealed that it was made as a concession to the leaders of the Independence Conference.⁴⁰

As far as the hyphenate issue was concerned, the master strokes of the campaign were engineered by the Democrats. The President was able to exploit German- and Irish-American opposition to his fullest advantage. Late in September the German-tainted Jeremiah O'Leary, who was one of the leaders of the American Independence Conference and who received funds for some of his activities from the Germans,⁴¹ sent Wilson an abusive telegram denouncing his attacks and his "pro-British" attitude. Shrewdly, Wilson released this message to the press along with the following reply: "I would feel deeply mortified to have you or any body like you vote for me. Since you have access to many disloyal

³⁶ Quoted in "The Republican Side of the Campaign," *Outlook*, CXIV (September 13, 1916), 63.

³⁷ Child, *German-Americans in Politics*, 136; *New York Times*, October 23, 24, 1916.

³⁸ Quoted in *New York Times*, October 10, 1916.

³⁹ *Fatherland*, V (October 18, 1916), 171.

⁴⁰ *New York Times*, October 23, 24, 1916.

⁴¹ For evidence of some of O'Leary's connections with the Germans and for a description of his activities see Senate Committee on Judiciary, *Senate Document No. 61*, 21-22; Mixed Claims Commission, *United States and Germany, Opinions and Decisions in the Sabotage Claims Handed Down June 15, 1939 and October 30, 1939*, Washington, 1939, 22-23.

Americans and I have not, I will ask you to convey this message to them."⁴²

This final denunciation of the hyphenates was made even more effective by the dramatic publication of the executive committee minutes of the American Independence Conferences. These had fallen into the hands of the Democratic National Committee and revealed the nature of Hughes' secret conference with representatives of the group.⁴³ Hughes was forced to admit that the conference had occurred and to make a futile effort to repudiate such support.⁴⁴ But, the damage had already been done.

Like most elections, the one in 1916 was far too complex to claim that it was decided by any single issue. Many issues were probably equally as significant as hyphenation. Wilson's appeal as the President who "kept us out of war" may have had more impact among rank and file German-Americans, especially in the Mid-West and Far West, than any of the propaganda against the President that had long appeared in the German-American press.⁴⁵

Certainly the results of the election do not bear out the contention that there was a Teutonic vote mobilized behind Hughes in the interest of a foreign power. Wilson was elected by a combination of Southern and Western support. In states like Illinois, Iowa, and New York where the Republican-Progressive breach had been closed, Hughes was successful, but in the Far West where the "old guard" Republicans controlled party machinery the erstwhile Progressives supported Wilson. In the East, Irish opposition and unenthusiastic Democratic machines in the cities hurt Wilson and enabled Hughes to win all the states but New Hampshire, where Republicans and Progressives were feuding.

States with heavy German populations, like Wisconsin, went for Hughes by a narrow margin. But, Wilson carried such German strongholds as Milwaukee, St. Louis, and Hoboken. In a few places, such as Cincinnati, the German-Americans did follow their leaders. Possibly Minnesota, which went for Hughes by only several hundred votes, would not have been in his column had not several normally Democratic counties which were heavily German voted for him. In Ohio Roosevelt's campaign may have caused

⁴² Quoted in *New York Times*, September 30, 1916.

⁴³ Link, *Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era*, 245-246; *New York Times*, October 23, 24, 1916.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, October 24, 25, 1916.

⁴⁵ Paul M. Buck, "Pacifism in the Middle West," *Nation*, CIV (May 17, 1917), 595; Wittke, *German-Americans and the World War*, 111.

the German-Americans of Columbus and Cleveland to vote for Wilson and thus cost Hughes the state. But, in such states as Washington and Idaho where German minorities voted as a group for the Republican candidate, their action had no effect on the election.⁴⁶

In the long run, the election was very damaging to Berlin's goals of keeping the United States out of the war and mobilizing the German-American element as a political force in favor of the Central Powers. The German-American element, and especially its leadership, emerged from the campaign discredited. The defeat of Hughes was in a sense a defeat for the German-American Alliance which thereafter fell into rapid decline.⁴⁷ Thus, the group which was most favorable to the *Reich* was rendered impotent as a political force.

More important than the discrediting of this pro-German element was the fact that many Americans were resentful of what they considered as German interference in American politics. As early as a year before the campaign the *New York World* had claimed, "The German propaganda in the United States has become a political conspiracy against the government and people of the United States."⁴⁸ Other papers throughout the country expressed similar resentment at the attempts of German propagandists to influence political currents in the United States.⁴⁹ The election reinforced this reaction to such an extent that one authority has described the campaign of 1916 as "the European war in America."⁵⁰

Even more disastrous for Berlin was the effect of the election on the Wilson Administration. Because many of the professional German-Americans and Irish-Americans with whom German diplomats has been known to work were actively engaged in a campaign against the President and his foreign policy, it was only natural that the Administration's distrust of the *Reich* deepened. This was reflected by the President in his campaign references to a small alien minority working in the interest of a

⁴⁶ This analysis of the election is based on Buck, "Pacifism in the Middle West," 595; *New York Times*, November 12, 1916; Link, *Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era*, 249-251; Wittke, *German-Americans and the World War*, 110.

⁴⁷ Child, *German-Americans in Politics*, 154.

⁴⁸ Quoted in "Light on German Propaganda," *Literary Digest*, LI (August 28, 1915), 388.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

⁵⁰ Child, *German-Americans in Politics*, 153.

foreign power. Perhaps Secretary of State Lansing best expressed this distrust. Looking back on the German activities, he felt that they represented interference by the German Government and its agents in the political situation in the United States—a grievous violation of diplomatic custom. He wrote:

A government has always resented and rightly, any attempt by a foreign government to influence its people in regard to questions of a domestic nature, and especially those which relate to party politics. No government with a due sense of dignity will allow to pass unnoticed so flagrant a breach of international propriety.⁵¹

Thus, the German efforts to use the German element in the United States as a political club produced exactly the opposite effect than the one desired. It discredited the German minority and increased the already growing distrust of German motives in the Wilson Administration; a distrust which eventually moved the United States from a policy of neutrality to one of intervention on the side of the Allies.

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⁵¹ Lansing, *War Memoirs*, 76.

Gompers and Racism: Strategy of Limited Objectives

Samuel Gompers was a man of the pre-World War I era who survived into another era without adapting to it. His reputation has suffered from the antagonism he created after 1917. One of the areas in which he has been severely criticized is his racism.¹ A careful study of his attitude toward Negroes has been made by Bernard Mandel in "Samuel Gompers and the Negro Worker 1886-1914."² Professor Mandel has traced the policies of the A. F. of L. and Gompers toward Negroes with care. There can be no disputing the accuracy of his scholarship. There can be dispute, however, about what meaning should be attached to Professor Mandel's findings. Mandel's interpretation was that Gompers was a man who

compromised his principles and fell in line with the narrow policy of the labor officials on whom he depended for his job. The evolution of Gompers' view on the Negro question provides one of the most striking illustrations of his transformation from a militant and radical labor agitator to a conservative, stand-pat bureaucrat.³

Professor Mandel's method has been to gather together all of Gompers' statements and actions relating to Negroes and to develop a history of these attitudes. By thus removing Gompers

¹ Arthur Mann, "Samuel Gompers and the Irony of Racism," *Antioch Review*, XIII (June, 1953), 203-214.

² *Journal of Negro History*, XL (January, 1955), 34-61.

³ *Ibid.*, 34. In other relevant quotations Mandel believes that Gompers' surrender of principles to the "practical" led to successive surrenders, (pp. 51, 54). In a summary opinion Mandel states:

"Gompers had begun with a relatively advanced attitude toward Negro workers. But this attitude was based on a narrow trade union desire to keep the Negroes from competing with white labor, and neglected the broader vision of labor solidarity which marked the policy of the Knights of Labor. Furthermore, the positive aspects of his policy were mixed with a considerable amount of racial prejudice and lack of concern for the special problem of the Negroes. So it was easy for him to retreat to a policy of jim-crowism when his principles were attacked by the trade union leaders who desired to solve the problem by excluding the Negroes from industrial life altogether. In his typically pragmatic way, Gompers could justify the surrender of principle as 'theoretically bad but practically necessary' and finally arrive at the conclusion that it was not even theoretically wrong. He kept the Negroes out of the labor movement and then declared that they deserved no better because they had not made common cause with the white workingman. Thus he sacrificed both his principles and the Negro workingman, as well as the broader interests of the whole labor movement, to the short-sighted and selfish demands of the aristocratic officialdom of the craft unions whose spokesmen he had agreed to be." (p. 61)

racial attitude from its surrounding nexus he has arrived at findings which are accurate, but whose meaning and import seem to have been distorted. Samuel Gompers did not compromise his basic principles, or pander to the prejudices of others. His failing, in fact, was in the other direction. He often held so rigidly to principles that he could not adapt to new situations. In assessing whether or not he abandoned principle, however, it is important always to be sure to make the judgement in relation to *his* principles, *his* basic goals and not those of the investigator or of a period or group to which Gompers did not belong.

In fact Gompers' principles had nothing whatever to do with Negroes. To evaluate correctly any of Gompers' attitudes one must keep in mind two beliefs which underlay every major idea he held, and every important policy he followed. The first of these was his class consciousness, the second his analysis of the function of power in society.

In perhaps the most perceptive interpretation of Gompers ever written, John R. Commons pointed out that Gompers' class consciousness was more compelling than even that of Karl Marx. Marx, when he turned his ideas into action, was glad to accept aid from any quarter. For Gompers, however, anyone not strictly from the working class was an object of suspicion and scorn.⁴ He considered class consciousness something to be proud of, and boasted that only trade unions embodied true class consciousness.⁵ Moreover he knew exactly what he meant by the term: "those who belong to the class are conscious of the fact, and are conscious, too, of the fact that their interests as a class are separate and distinct from any other class."⁶ To Gompers there were quite simply two classes: we and they. Between the workers and the capitalists was a bottomless and unbridgeable gulf. This gulf was caused by the natural and unavoidable conflict of interest derived from the economic fact that the buyers and sellers of any commodity, even labor, were inevitably antagonistic.⁷ He saw one eighth

⁴ John R. Commons, "Karl Marx and Samuel Gompers," *Political Science Quarterly*, XLI (June, 1926), 281-286.

⁵ *American Federationist*, IV (July, 1897), 99. Unless otherwise indicated all references to this periodical are to the editorials which Gompers wrote.

⁶ *Ibid.*, IV (August, 1897), 114.

⁷ Gompers to John Elliot, Canton, Ohio, November 1, 1892. Unless otherwise indicated, Gompers' letters are from the letterbooks in the A.F.L.-C.I.O. headquarters, Washington, D.C. Gompers to Frank M. Notton, Ashland, Wisconsin, December 2, 1893; Gompers to P. J. McGuire, Philadelphia, Pa., November 4, 1892; *American Federationist*, VIII (June, 1901), 215; VIII (November, 1901), 479; I (July, 1894), 99.

of society living by exploiting the other seven eighths who actually produced the wealth.⁸

Gompers saw the warfare between these groups in rather simple Darwinian terms. He regarded economic enterprise in general as a species of warfare, in which his side had to defeat the other side.⁹ His terminology was insistently military: invade, march, column, enemies, skirmish. He apparently regarded himself not so much as a reform leader, but as a military commander.¹⁰ He regarded labor as a nation within a nation, threatened on all sides by its enemies.¹¹

The victory which Gompers sought was not to be gained merely by being right. His troops had to go into battle and wrench their demands from the capitalists.¹² "Liberty has never been conceded to people," he insisted, "Liberty comes from power, and conscious power, and that conscious power intelligently and humanely wielded."¹³ Here we come to the question of Gompers' views on the uses of power in effecting social change.

Gompers of course thought that labor's power should be used to its fullest extent. In answering a query as to whether a union might fine a non-member for scabbing he replied: "It is a matter of power, where the union has the power it should punish the crime of scabbing."¹⁴ However just as important as using power to its utmost extent was not using it beyond that extent. Frequently he cautioned unions, especially newly formed unions in which zeal and enthusiasm often outran resources, not to rush into a strike. "Justification does not always lead to successful strikes," Gompers said, "You must not only be right, and be able to justify your position, but you must possess the might and be able to support your right."¹⁵ Gompers, unlike some reformers, recognized clearly the limits of his power.

The problem was that Gompers' power was rather limited indeed. He had to determine how best to apply his slender power

⁸ *Ibid.*, I (July, 1894), 98.

⁹ *Ibid.*, VII (June, 1900), 165.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, VII (May, 1900), 134; VII (June, 1900), 165; VII (October, 1900), 314; VIII (September, 1901), 358.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, IX (February, 1902), 71.

¹² *Ibid.*, IX (April, 1902), 183; XII (July, 1905), 449; XIX (February, 1912), 101-114; XIX (July, 1912), 553.

¹³ *Ibid.*, XII (February, 1905), 74.

¹⁴ Gompers to John B. Lennon, Journeyman Tailors Union of America, August 11, 1890.

¹⁵ Gompers to F. W. Gilwreath, Secretary of Lathers Union 5112, August 19, 1891; Gompers to George S. Burelson, Secretary of Federal Labor Union 5478, August 22, 1891.

against the large might of his enemies the capitalists. Gompers' solution had two parts: first to develop a highly unified body of hard core troops and second to apply his force in a strictly circumscribed area.

To carry the ramparts of its enemies most effectively Gompers thought that a union should be made

protective in its character. In other words members of the Union should be required to pay higher dues into the Union and to receive a considerable benefit from it and thus to inlist [sic] the material interests of the members in the Union; not so much for the sake of the material interests but for the sake of keeping them in the Union. When that is once secured, progress can be made in any direction. . . .¹⁶

Gompers simply did not believe that the trade union movement could afford to worry about those who were either unwilling or unable to pay high dues. A closely knit group was for him far more important than a large one. A well known outgrowth of this way of thinking was Gompers' insistence that only true wage earners had a place in the labor movement. "It is essential for us to maintain the purity of our movement, unsullied from partisan or other corrupting influences", he said.¹⁷ At one point Gompers even refused to attend an anti-injunction meeting because he was afraid non-union forces would dominate the meeting.¹⁸

In the interest of creating a hard core, conflict within the trade union movement had to be strictly avoided. Jurisdictional disputes, expulsion of union men and the like were dangerous, and should be averted.¹⁹ However this by no means meant that union organization and membership should be maintained at all cost. Gompers was willing to have some members drift out of the unions, or even have some locals collapse if the members or locals were weak, ill prepared or not militant enough.²⁰

¹⁶ Gompers to Mrs. T. J. Morgan, September 10, 1891; *American Federationist*, VI (December, 1899), 248.

¹⁷ Gompers to John M. Callahan, General Organizer, New Orleans, Louisiana, October 31, 1892; Gompers to E. H. Cherry, Owasso, Michigan, January 11, 1892; Gompers to S. P. Holmes, Findlay, Ohio, October 8, 1890; *American Federationist*, IV (August, 1897), 115-116.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, IV (October, 1897), 191.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, XII (January, 1905), 18; Gompers to Hiram J. Bell, Secretary of Street Car Employees Union 6005, Hamilton, Ohio, May 31, 1893. This desire to avoid internecine fights, plus the A.F. of L. policy of trade union autonomy made it difficult for Gompers to enforce an unpopular policy.

²⁰ Gompers to Henry Demerest Lloyd, April 18, 1892, Lloyd Papers, State Historical Society of Wisconsin, Madison, Wisconsin.

The very existence of class warfare provided both an imperative reason for a tough united labor movement and also a whetstone against which this economic weapon could be sharpened. Gompers had as one of his principle aims an increase in "the recognition by the workers of the imperative necessity of this two-fold unity of trade and class."²¹ He was pleased whenever he saw a "growing spirit of solidarity" or a determination on the part of the workers to "work out their own salvation."²² Indeed, this spirit of solidarity was not only a basis on which trade union organization could be built, but was itself an aim toward which trade union organization tended. Organization cemented "the bonds of friendship and solidarity between organized workers."²³ Unions "led men toward the upper heights of working class unity."²⁴ A strike, especially a sympathetic strike, could sometimes therefore bring great benefits even if the immediate ends of the strike were not won. "Loyalty, self-sacrifice, fellowship" could be engendered purely by the act of striking.²⁵ Gompers therefore was willing to strike and risk loosing if unity could thereby be increased in adversity.²⁶

This was the weapon which Gompers created in his fight with the capitalists, a hand picked body of thoroughly convinced loyal troops. He also had definite ideas on the best way these troops should be employed against a superior enemy. Rather than steady pressure against a broad front, he was convinced that trade unions should exert sharp pressure in a narrow area.

One manifestation of this strategy of limited objectives was Gompers' original emphasis on purely bread and butter goals: hours, wages and working conditions. Even more specifically, of these three Gompers concentrated first on hours alone. In the spring of 1897 he wrote a series of articles in the *American Federationist* urging the importance of "The Eight-Hour Work Day." The eight hour movement, he thought, should be the first order of business. Union efforts, in the 1890's at least, should be concentrated behind this single effort.²⁷

²¹ *American Federationist*, VII (August, 1900), 246; *Ibid.*, IX (March, 1902), 112.

²² Gompers to Emil Applehagen, General Organizer, Duluth, Minnesota, September 11, 1890.

²³ *American Federationist*, IX (January, 1902), 22.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, VII (October, 1900), 314.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, IX (October, 1904), 911.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, VIII (April, 1901), 122-123.

²⁷ March, April, May, 1897; Gompers to Aaron King, Secretary of Hod Carriers Union, January 12, 1892; Philip Taft, *The A. F. of L. in the Time of Gompers*, New York, 1957, 142-146.

A well known outgrowth of the strategy of limited objectives was Gompers' gradualism. Recognizing that the union movement could not achieve complete justice immediately, he counseled taking what it could get. He thought pressure should be applied at the weakest point and partial victory accepted.²⁸

Gompers' opposition to partisan political activity was another manifestation of this strategy. He had seen trade unions hurt and even destroyed by trying to be both a union and a political organization. He therefore felt that unions should stay out of the "miasmatic atmosphere of political party corruption."²⁹ He counseled a policy of "masterful inactivity" on the political front, and excoriated both the Knights of Labor and the socialists for trying to bring pressure on both the political and economic fronts.³⁰ He only abandoned the principle of applying purely economic pressure when he was forced to do so. He was driven from his position by the Danbury Hatters' case. Gompers was dismayed and outraged by this decision which, he felt, took away labor's economic power. The A. F. of L. therefore had to turn to political action for redress.³¹ The fact that the Democratic party was receptive to labor's demands while the Republicans were not forced the A. F. of L. to become partisan.³²

Gompers' theory of the uses of limited power, then, was that a hard core of tough troops should be used against limited objectives. The battle he was fighting was, of course, that of class warfare. In practice this meant he wanted to create a sturdy trade union organization which would not dissipate its strength in a variety of schemes, but would concentrate on first things first. This was the principle upon which Gompers acted. It was this principle to which he held unwaveringly and before which all other goals faded into insignificance. Before this principle the organization of the mass industries, effective political action

²⁸ Gompers to George S. Burleson, Secretary of Federal Labor Union 5478, August 22, 1891; Gompers to Aaron King, January 12, 1892; *American Federationist*, V (June, 1895), 70; XVII (February, 1910), 146; XVII (June, 1910), 489.

²⁹ Gompers to Dennis J. Bulkly, Superior, Wisconsin, September 13, 1900; *Report of the Proceedings of the Seventeenth Annual Convention of the American Federation of Labor*, Washington, D. C., 1891, 15; Louis S. Reed, *The Labor Philosophy of Samuel Gompers*, New York, 1930, 97-103.

³⁰ Samuel Gompers, "Organized labor in the Campaign of 1892," *North American Review*, CLV (July, 1892), 91-96; *American Federationist*, V (May, 1898), 54; V (August, 1898), 115.

³¹ *Ibid.*, XV (March, 1908), 180-192; XV (April, 1908), 276-279; XV (June, 1908), 457.

³² *Ibid.*, XV (August, 1908), 603; XIX (November, 1912), 889-894.

and racial equality became mere detail. It is in this context that Gompers' racism must be understood.

Within this context he was certainly a racist. His diatribes against the Chinese were as vicious as they are well known. He thought that orientals were completely unassimilable into American culture, and he warned that all of modern civilization would come crashing down if the oriental hordes were allowed into the United States.³³ However Gompers' ultimate appeal was always on the basis of class welfare. Orientals, he insisted were cheap workers who drove Caucasians out of any trade they entered. Only selfish interests and perhaps a few "dilettante sentimentalists" wanted orientals in this country.³⁴ These Asiatics, he agreed with Kipling, were "a nation with a devil-born capacity for doing more work than they ought."³⁵ It was on these grounds rather than racist grounds that Gompers concluded "Chinese exclusion is the desire of the toiling masses and must be maintained."³⁶

Similarly Gompers was always willing, even in the 1890's, to subordinate Negro equality to trade union strength. He did make statements, both public and private, in favor of equal treatment regardless of race.³⁷ However right from the beginning he was unwilling to sacrifice the union movement to equal treatment. This is well illustrated by an incident involving two union organizers in New Orleans, John M. Callahan, white and George L. Norton, Negro. Callahan was something less than co-operative with Norton who himself was resented by any white workers he tried to organize. Gompers wrote to both men pleading for harmony between them. To Callahan he said that Negroes too must be organized or they would underbid organized workers. To Norton he insisted that he never made distinctions between white and black, but that effective organization was more important than racial parity. He advised Norton to avoid contact with men who would resent him, to concentrate on organizing Negroes and leave the whites to others.³⁸ To this point of view Gompers held steadfastly. In 1900 he declared that although discrimination

³³ *Ibid.*, I (May, 1894), 50; VIII (September, 1901), 362; IX (March, 1902), 125; XII (November, 1905), 833.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, VIII (August, 1901), 305-306.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, IX (February, 1902), 70.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, I (May, 1894), 50-51.

³⁷ Mandel, "Gompers and the Negro Worker," *loc. cit.*, 34-36 and *passim*.

³⁸ Gompers to Callahan, May 17, 1892; to Norton, May 16 and 17, 1892.

based on race, sex or nationality was bad, non-discrimination must give way before trade union organization.³⁹ He repeated this argument on other occasions.⁴⁰

It is wrong therefore to accuse Gompers of being either a hypocrite or a backslider. He had a clear and consistent value system to which he remained true. Was his value system right? In his own terms it was, for Samuel Gompers created a viable labor movement where none had existed before. Out of the shambles after the Haymarket Affair he forged a movement which survived the depression of the 1890's and the violence of the Pullman strike. Gompers did not take upon himself the task of ending all injustice in the world. To others he left the task of achieving justice for Negroes. Moreover these others have been most effective when they have followed his strategy.

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³⁹ *Report of the Proceedings of the Twentieth Annual Convention of the American Federation of Labor*, Washington, D. C., 1900, 23.

⁴⁰ *American Federationist*, VIII (April, 1901), 118-120; XII (September, 1905), 131-132. For other examples see Mandel, "Gompers and the Negro Worker," *loc. cit.*, 46-61.

Charles Francis Adams, Antimasonry, and the Presidential Election of 1836

Charles Francis Adams, son of John Quincy, and not yet thirty years of age, became involved in the Presidential maneuvers of 1835-1836 almost accidentally. Early in, May, 1835, Benjamin F. Hallett, editor of an Antimasonic paper, the *Advocate*, disclosed to him in a chance meeting that the paper was on the verge of failure. The decreasing strength of Antimasonry as a distinct party movement had left the *Advocate* without sufficient financial support, and Hallett told Adams that if the paper was to survive at all, he would soon be forced to accept overtures from one of the two major parties, the Whigs or the Democrats. Hallett confessed that at the moment he preferred the Presidential candidacy of Martin Van Buren, the Democrat, to any other.¹ Adams thoroughly disliked the principles of the Democratic party, but he was angry with the Webster Whigs of Massachusetts for a recent "deal" whereby, for "selfish reasons," they had by-passed his father and elected instead Governor John Davis to the national Senate. Burning with resentment at what he considered a glaring injustice, Adams, who had until recently been active in the Antimasonic movement, decided to encourage Hallett's inclination to support Van Buren, and in fact to join actively in the effort to swing independent Antimasonic support to him.² It was an opportunity, Adams felt, "to pay off some scores besides doing what I believe the only advisable thing."³ Adams and Hallett were soon joined by Alexander Everett, brother of Edward, and late editor of the *North American Review*. The three men decided to cooperate in writing for the *Advocate*, although Alexander Everett at first preferred the idea of starting a new paper. Adams, however, refused any arrangement "built upon the ruins of the *Advocate*," and Everett finally agreed to make the older paper their organ.⁴

¹ CFA Diary, May 4, 1835, Microfilm Edition of the Adams Papers. Unless otherwise specified, all quotes from Adams' diary and letters come from this source.

² CFA Diary, May 14, 1835.

³ CFA Diary, May 22, 1835.

⁴ CFA Diary, May 14, 1835.

Adams launched a series of articles for the *Advocate*, in which he warned that the Whigs were at least in part the party of Southern nullification. For New Englanders to unite with such men and such doctrines was neither natural nor consistent, he argued, and would necessarily lead to concessions on such fundamental questions as the tariff and internal improvements. Van Buren, on the other hand, he somewhat disingenuously wrote, represented "too many States deeply interested in the liberal construction to be otherwise than liberal himself. . . ."⁵

In June John Quincy Adams returned to Massachusetts from Washington. In the Congressional session just completed he had supported Andrew Jackson's stand on executive power of removal from office, and he now stimulated his son into writing a series of articles defending Jackson and taking issue with Webster, who had called Jackson's removals an invasion of the rights of the Senate. The articles which resulted were printed simultaneously in the *Advocate* and the *Centinel* under the title, "An Appeal from the New to the Old Whigs, by a Whig of the Old School." In the series Charles Francis invoked the opinions of Oliver Ellsworth, James Madison and John Marshall to prove that the Constitution intended to give the power of removal from office to the President alone, and not to subject it, like the power of appointment, to the consent of the Senate. If the fathers of the Constitution had intended to give such power to the Senate, they would have expressly mentioned it, Adams argued, for this was their practice in all cases where they conferred a power of one branch upon any other. The Senate, he wrote,

is claiming for itself more than its' due share of power. It is endeavouring to reduce the President to a state of dependence upon it for his Officers which will subvert in the end the whole principle of the balance of the three powers so studiously introduced into the Constitution by its framers.⁶

It was a well-reasoned, forcefully presented argument; probably the best piece of political writing Charles Francis Adams ever did. He was conscious of the power of the series, and felt he had succeeded in frightening the Whigs into silence. "I have now the right end of the whip," he wrote, "and mean to apply the lash."⁷ Yet he soon began to wonder whether the silence of the

⁵ CFA, "Political Speculation," No. 7, "Miscellany" [part of Microfilm Edition of the Adams Papers].

⁶ CFA, "An Appeal. . .," "Miscellany."

⁷ CFA Diary, Aug. 3, 1835.

opposition press was due to fear or to simple indifference. In late August, therefore, he decided to publish "The Appeal" in pamphlet form at his own expense in order to give it a new chance of being read. At first the response was disappointing; the pamphlet sold badly and elicited almost no comment. The fault, Adams decided, lay with the public; they had no taste for constitutional controversies, and moreover, they discouraged "talent when connected with [a] great name."⁸ By October, however, "The Appeal" had begun to excite at least some newspaper comment, and sales on it slowly picked up.

* * * *

Adams hoped to rally Antimasonic support for Van Buren, but at the same time to maintain a position independent of both major parties. He was fighting Webster and the Whigs, it was true, but this did not mean to him that he must therefore put on "the collar of Jacksonism." "My natural feelings," he wrote, "are in themselves too moderate for any party, and consequently I am regularly walking the path between one side and the other, now and then touching and rebounding immediately."⁹ He became indignant with Alexander Everett when the latter suggested taking up "a miserable radical [Democratic] paper" to help affect the fall elections in Massachusetts. To do so, Adams thought, would be a sign of either "degradation or desperation."

"I must either be expected to bend to a tone which would please the reformers, a tone which I despise, or to raise them to me which is a vain and absurd hope."¹⁰

Adams was attempting to tread a fine line—to be neither a Jacksonian nor a Whig at a time when the country was grouping into one or the other of these divisions. Moreover, he was attempting to single out serious issues for discussion—such as the President's constitutional power of removal from office—while the community was responding to personalities and the emotional appeal of party politics. Further, he was attempting to throw Antimasonic support to Van Buren, the leader of a party whose policies he did not generally adhere to, and to combat the Whig party

⁸ CFA Diary, Oct. 2, 1835; it was reprinted in the *Washington Globe*, however, and Madison sent Adams a complimentary note on it. (CFA Diary, Nov. 27, 1865.)

⁹ CFA Diary, April 14, 1836.

¹⁰ CFA Diary, Aug. 24, 1835.

which, in its New England branch at least, most closely represented his own beliefs.

Yet it was difficult to support the leader of a party without adopting that party's principles. At one time, for example, the *Advocate* printed several standard Democratic attacks on the Bank of the United States, and John Quincy Adams warned Charles Francis that his fight in Congress in favor of the Bank was embarrassed by his son's connection with the paper. Charles Francis objected to the assumption that the opinions of father and son were inseparably united in the eyes of the world, but since he agreed with his father's stand on the Bank issue, he spoke to Hallett about the difficulty.¹¹ Hallett admitted that he himself was opposed to the national Bank, but claimed that the pieces had been inserted during his absence, and he promised that in future no attacks upon the Bank would be allowed in the paper.¹² Yet the fact that a public stand on such a basic question as the Bank fight had to be suppressed, is indicative of the tenuity of the alliance that bound Charles Francis Adams to the Van Buren group.

On the state level there were even more difficulties in becoming too closely associated with the Democrats, for in Massachusetts two factions of the Democracy were warring against each other. The "Custom House" or "Post" party, headed by David Henshaw, was allied with the Calhoun faction of the national party, and included the Masonic and more conservative elements. The second group, led by Marcus Morton, were strong Van Buren partisans and contained the reform or "loco-foco" Democrats. They had more sympathy with the Antimasons, but welcomed their alliance chiefly for the aid it would give them in overwhelming the "Post" clique.¹³ Adams, therefore, had reason to dislike both factions; one for being pro-Masonic and pro-Southern, the other for being too "radical." He thus determined to remain aloof from the internal disputes of his allies and even from specific identification with them.¹⁴ His aim was to convince the Anti-

¹¹ CFA Diary, Sept. 10, 1835.

¹² CFA Diary, Sept. 11, 1835. Both Hallett and Everett were too uncomfortably "loco-foco" in their inclinations for Adams' taste. Eg. CFA Diary, Dec. 21, 1835: "In truth I am perfectly aware of the fundamental differences of opinion which exist between Mr. Hallett and myself."

¹³ Arthur B. Darling, *Political Changes in Massachusetts, 1824-1848*, New Haven, 1925, 192, 195.

¹⁴ Thus he refused to make a speech at a Faneuil Hall meeting of all parties uniting on Van Buren. It had been gotten up, he felt, by the Locofocos, who "were working to appear the genuine party to the ex-

masons to support Van Buren independently, through their own distinctive organization.

The state election results in 1835 proved better than the *Advocate* group had anticipated. Edward Everett, the Whig candidate, was elected Governor—with Antimasonic endorsement—but the Whig vote was considerably off the previous years' tally in such strongholds as Boston. Moreover, because the Antimasons had supported the Democratic candidate for Lieutenant Governor, the Whigs barely squeezed their man into that office.¹⁵ Even more encouraging was the large accession of Antimasonic and Democratic strength in both branches of the state legislature, especially in the Senate. Adams felt that a heavy blow had been struck at Whig prestige in Massachusetts, and that the *Advocate* had emerged as the head "of a very formidable party" in the state.¹⁶

* * * *

Daniel Webster's hope of becoming the Presidential candidate of a united Whig party was blasted in December, 1835, when the Pennsylvania Antimasonic convention chose William Henry Harrison instead, and the Whigs of that state concurred in the choice a few days later. Actually, Webster had never had much chance of becoming the national Whig leader. The stigma of the old Federalist party was too much on him for the taste of the West or South. Charles Francis Adams had recognized the futility of the Massachusetts nomination of Webster as long ago as the previous year, when he had written that the nomination "will not be sustained... as a party measure... every division of the Whigs will consider this as a signal for making that nomination most agreeable to each."¹⁷

And this in fact is precisely what happened. Instead of nominating one candidate to oppose Van Buren, the Whigs soon had three regional candidates in the field: Webster from New England, William Henry Harrison from the West, and Judge Hugh Lawson White, a recently estranged Jacksonian, from the South. It

elusion of... the Custom House party against whom they entertain a feud growing out of a division of spoils—To this effect they pounce upon the new acquisition of Antimasons... and get up a meeting exclusive enough to drive away all but themselves..." (CFA Diary, Feb. 11, 1836).

¹⁵ *American Traveller* [Boston], Nov. 10, 17, 1835.

¹⁶ CFA Diary, Nov. 10, 1835.

¹⁷ CFA, "Political Speculation," No. 1, Jan. 20, 1835, *Boston Advocate*, "Miscellany."

was hoped that Van Buren would thereby be prevented from getting a majority of the electoral vote, and that the contest would be thrown into the House, where the Whigs felt they had a good chance of electing one of their number. The *Advocate* strongly denounced this strategy and piously objected to any attempt to defeat a choice by the people.¹⁸

For a short while after the Pennsylvania defeat, the maneuvers of Webster's supporters helped further to complicate the political situation in Massachusetts. Edward Everett, a leader of the Webster Whigs, told Hallett that as it was rumored Webster would withdraw altogether from the race, many of his friends, rather than support any other Whig, desired to join the Anti-masons in a national convention in favor of Van Buren.¹⁹ Further confirmation that some such scheme was brewing came from a Mr. Ward, member of the National Antimasonic Committee, who wrote Hallett asking him to suspend all attacks upon Webster in the *Advocate*. Ward forwarded the information that ten Pennsylvania Antimasons, who had been friendly to Webster, had seceded from the Harrisburg Antimasonic Convention which had nominated Harrison, and now proposed taking up Van Buren. To that end they had nominated thirty-two delegates to meet in a National Antimasonic Convention in May.²⁰

Adams, however, had no wish for such allies. He feared that this adherence of the Webster Whigs to the Antimasonic-Van Buren alliance would simply result in "re-establishing the tyrannical and treacherous domination" which the recent election had shaken.²¹ Moreover, Adams doubted if the Websterites, once in control of a National Antimasonic Convention, would be able to resist the temptation to nominate Webster (or even Harrison) rather than Van Buren.²² In any case, it would mean union with some of the Massachusetts Whigs, and Adams felt that "no peace with such allies *can* be lasting."²³ It seems clear that he was more interested in handing a defeat to Massachusetts Whiggery than in gaining allies to help elect Van Buren. Both Hallett and Alexander Everett agreed with Adams that they would at once withdraw from active participation if the union with Webster came to pass.²⁴

¹⁸ *Boston Advocate*, July 15, 1835.

¹⁹ CFA Diary, Dec. 26, 1835.

²⁰ CFA Diary, Dec. 26, 1835.

²¹ CFA Diary, Dec. 26, 1835.

²² CFA to JQA, Dec. 28, 1835.

²³ *Ibid.*

²⁴ *Ibid.*

In the meantime, they worked hard to prevent it. First they refused to recognize the Pennsylvania seceders as the true representatives of the Antimasonic Party of that state:

... the idea that ten seceders from a Convention of 140 and more... six of them from a single burrough of Pittsburgh, assuming the ground that the body exceeded their powers in nominating a candidate for the Presidency, when the six had been instructed to support Mr. Webster, can represent the Antimasons to the exclusion of the Governor and all the men of official influence of the State together with a formal vote of the full Convention declining to be represented, is the height of absurdity.²⁵

Secondly, the *Advocate* group decided that the proposed National Convention should be discouraged:

Even in a single State [Penn.] antimasons could not agree to nominate a distinct candidate... how idle to attempt to do it in a Convention of half a dozen States? The argument is conclusive against going into a National Convention, merely to quarrel upon matters not connected with the principles of Antimasonry. In those principles we all agree, but on the Presidency the Antimasons of the different States must act for themselves, separate from a National Convention, according to local circumstances. The next Presidency is not a question of Antimasonry, and cannot be made such. We must act upon it not as distinct Antimasons but as good citizens...²⁶

Thus, in effect, the *Advocate* group admitted that their decision to support Van Buren did not rest primarily on a desire to foster Antimasonic principles. Van Buren, it should be remembered, was not even an avowed Antimason. Indeed, when the proposed National Antimasonic Convention did actually meet,²⁷ the *Advocate* published a stern rebuke to that gathering for requesting statements from both Van Buren and Harrison regarding their attitude towards Masonry. When Van Buren answered the query in a characteristically non-committal way, the *Advocate* praised it as

... the most antimasonic of the two. He [Van Buren] says distinctly that Masonry would be no ground of *objection*... Masons have heretofore been *preferred* as applicants for office... It was not our object to break down the Masonic monopoly... and then build up an Antimasonic monopoly... Mr. Van Buren... has never professed to

²⁵ CFA Diary, Dec. 26 1835.

²⁶ *Boston Advocate*, January 1, 1836.

²⁷ It was very thinly attended and included only the Pennsylvania seceders, one delegate from R.I., 4 or 5 from Ohio, 2 from New York. (*Boston Advocate*, Aug. 24, 1836.) No nomination was made by the convention.

be an Antimason, nor did the Antimasons of Massachusetts nominate him as an Antimason.²⁸

It soon became apparent that many of the Massachusetts Whigs were no more eager to embrace the Antimasonic-Van Buren cause than the *Advocate* group was to have them do so. The *Atlas*, a leading Whig paper in Boston, declared that it had no desire to support Van Buren, but, on the contrary, was determined to stick with Webster until the time should come when the election would go to the House, at which point Harrison or any person might be selected in preference to Mr. Van Buren. The *Globe*, edited by Blair, a Mason, likewise refused to consider an alliance with an Antimasonic group.²⁹ Whig opposition to union, therefore, tended to take two grounds—some would not support the heir of Jackson, others would not link themselves in any nomination with Antimasons.

Webster himself soon settled the matter by announcing that he would not withdraw as a candidate. The *Advocate* group breathed easier, especially since they had been receiving letters which seemed to point clearly to a plot to nominate Webster at the National Antimasonic Convention which had been proposed ostensibly to support Van Buren. Adams rejoiced that this "union which more than anything was to be dreaded by us" had not been consummated.³⁰

With this threat over, Adams threw himself into a heavy writing schedule in an attempt to convince Antimasons to support Van Buren. Many Antimasons were unsympathetic, however, as witnessed by the fact that a meeting of those Antimasons who opposed Van Buren was held in March,³¹ and the Websterites in particular had some strong talking points in their bid for Antimasonic support. Webster himself had gone far towards adopting Antimasonic principles and Edward Everett, then the Whig Governor, was known to have similar sympathies.³² The *Advocate* tried hard to discredit Everett, and stressed the fact that though he had been elected with Antimasonic support, he had used the Governor's office to appoint four Masons to high positions.³³ But Van Buren was hardly an

²⁸ *Boston Advocate*, Aug. 24, 1836.

²⁹ CFA Diary, Dec. 29, 1835.

³⁰ CFA Diary, Dec. 31, 1835.

³¹ As reported in the *Boston Advocate*, March 3, 1836.

³² C. M. Fuess, *Daniel Webster*, Boston, 1930, 2 vols., II, 41-42.

³³ *Boston Advocate*, May 13, Oct. 14, Oct. 18, 1836.

outspoken Antimason, and tenuous analogies had to be made to convince Antimasons that their principles were any safer in his hands:

...the Whigs...are the natural opponents of Antimasonry, the aristocratic and false clamor party of the country, while...the Antimonopoly doctrine of Mr. Van Buren and the Democracy, is a kindred principle to Antimasonry...taking in not only secret societies, but all combinations of the few against the many.³⁴

In a number of articles Adams tried to discourage support of Webster. He stressed the failure of the Massachusetts Whigs to incorporate Antimasonic principles into their program,³⁵ and declared that their real reason in running Webster was to allow the "Boston Regency" to maintain its hold on state offices.³⁶ Adams further argued that since Webster could not win anyway, a vote for him really amounted to a vote for White, who would have the best chance of election if the contest were thrown into the house, since the free states would probably divide between Van Buren, Harrison, and Webster. Yet White, Adams reminded his readers, represented "the bitterest, rooted prejudices which exist in the Southern States against us in this quarter."³⁷

In two other series of articles Adams took issue with those Antimasons who counselled support of Harrison.³⁸ First of all, he argued, Harrison was a General, which was a major objection the Whigs had levelled against Jackson. And, like Jackson, Adams felt, Harrison would be "entirely at the mercy of the merest breath of popular opinion...without head to devise or hands to execute any plan either for bad or for good."³⁹ Secondly, Harrison had no more chance of election than Webster, and a vote for him would simply serve to destroy any choice by the people. Finally, Harrison, like White, was unreliable on the slavery question. Both had declared that Congress could not legislate on the subject in the District of Columbia, while Van Buren, though denying the expediency, had at least admitted the right.⁴⁰ Van Buren, Adams

³⁴ *Boston Advocate*, May 12, 1836.

³⁵ CFA, "The Presidency," 1836, "Miscellany."

³⁶ CFA "Plain Thoughts for Plain People," #1, May 10, 1836, *Boston Advocate*.

³⁷ CFA, "The Presidency," 1836, "Miscellany,"; CFA, "Plain Thoughts for Plain People," #2, May 13, 1836, *Boston Advocate*.

³⁸ *Boston Advocate*, Jan.-March, 1836.

³⁹ CFA to JQA, May 18, 1836.

⁴⁰ CFA, "To the Unpledged Voter," No. 4, 1836, *Boston Advocate*, "Miscellany."

claimed, represented the antislavery sentiment of the North, though evidence adduced for this conclusion was again unsubstantial:

A majority of that portion of the democratic party which supports Mr. Van Buren . . . is to be found in the free states . . . and is aloof from the impulses which are carrying the country to Mexico. On the contrary, a majority of the parties which support Judge White and General Harrison, each or both, are directly in the current of popular enthusiasm running in that direction.⁴¹

In his various articles Adams stressed arguments against voting for the Whig candidates, but he rarely gave positive reasons for supporting Van Buren—for in fact this could not easily be done. On Masonry, slavery, or banking, Van Buren's views were ill-defined and certainly no more agreeable to men like Adams than those of Webster. In truth, Adams' main motive for supporting Van Buren had been to get revenge on the Massachusetts Whig leaders—and this was the one reason which could not be discussed in print.

* * * *

In order to achieve union upon an electoral ticket, a committee of thirteen was organized by the Antimasonic and Democratic members of the state legislature. Adams, though not holding an elective office, was asked to serve on it.⁴²

In the conferences of this committee, the differences of opinion between the various factions soon came to a head.⁴³ In the first place, the Antimasons objected to supporting Van Buren's running mate, Colonel R. Johnson, who was an avowed Mason. On the other hand, the Masons in the Democratic party, the "Post" clique, insisted upon a pledge to Johnson. They also demanded that the nomination of electors take place in the several districts, where Masonry would be stronger, rather than by legislative caucus. The "loco-foco" wing of the Democracy, on its part, wished to have all nominations decided upon by a convention in September. Motion after motion was made until Adams "despaired of a result," but the "steady determination of the Majority [of the Democratic party] to act in good faith" with the Antimasons effectively countered the pressures of the extremists. A joint electoral ticket was

⁴¹ CFA "To the Unpledged Voter," No. 2, *Boston Advocate*, 1836, "Miscellany."

⁴² CFA to JQA, Feb. 21, 1836.

⁴³ CFA to A. H. Everett, March 9, 1836.

pushed through in which the electors were left unpledged to Johnson, with an understanding that "the Antimasons will not, if elected, vote for him, unless he is explicit with them" as to his Masonic commitments.⁴⁴

Agreement over the electoral ticket, however, did not end the three-cornered feuding between the "Post" clique, the Antimasons, and the "loco-focos." Adams feared that the lack of harmony among the Van Buren men would adversely affect their chance of defeating the Whigs in the fall election. Therefore, when Henshaw, the leader of the "Post" group lost control of the State Democratic Committee and resigned the Collectorship, Adams welcomed the news, for he felt that Henshaw's rumored successor, Mr. Simpson, though also a member of the "Post" party, would be "of far more conciliatory disposition towards the Antimasons."⁴⁵ Adams also hoped that there would now be a change in the policy of the *Morning Post*, the organ of the "Post" group, which had previously "tried exceedingly hard to make a quarrel with the *Advocate* for the sake of splitting the party."⁴⁶ But increased harmony did not result from Henshaw's loss of power. On the contrary, his attempt to turn the collectorship over to Simpson caused an open breach in the Democratic party.⁴⁷ Though he disapproved of this continuous bickering, Adams saw some compensation in the open warfare of his allies in that it would give pause to those Antimasons anxious to absorb their party into the Democracy.⁴⁸ Adams, moreover, was by this time not unduly upset over the possibility of Van Buren's defeat, even though he thought it would probably mean the end of his own political career.⁴⁹

Van Buren's most serious drawback in Adams' eyes had always been his disposition "to fawn" upon the Southern States,⁵⁰ (despite Adams' public newspaper testimony to the contrary). Events in Congress in the spring of 1836 confirmed this fear, and did much to complete Adams' disenchantment. A bill to exclude "incendiary" literature on the slavery question from the mails was introduced in the Senate, where, although it failed of adoption, it received Van Buren's vote. This news put Hallett "in great

⁴⁴ CFA to A. H. Everett, March 9, 1836.

⁴⁵ CFA to JQA, April 26, 1836.

⁴⁶ CFA to JQA, April 26, 1836.

⁴⁷ Darling, *Political Changes*, 196-197; CFA Diary, May 5, 1836.

⁴⁸ CFA to JQA, May 28 1836.

⁴⁹ CFA Diary, May 3, 1836.

⁵⁰ CFA to JQA, May 18, 1836.

agony"; this vote, he claimed, destroyed Van Buren's chances in Vermont, Rhode Island, Massachusetts and Ohio. Adams was equally horrified; he reflected on "what a miserable thing it was to depend upon a man without settled principles."⁵¹ Still, they would have to continue their support of him, for their course had been marked out, and the alternative candidates continued to seem even less attractive.

John Quincy Adams in the House, had been greatly exercised by a similar attempt there to restrict all resolutions, petitions and discussions pertaining to the slavery question. Unfortunately, his opposition to that effort had re-allied him with the very Webster Whigs whom his son was fighting in Massachusetts.⁵² This development slackened Charles Francis' interest in the outcome of the election still further. He had pursued an active political course "mainly with a view to aid . . . [my father], and now that he does not need it, I go on only because I have got into the track."⁵³

* * * *

The November election resulted in Van Buren's elevation to the Presidency, though the loss of New York, or Pennsylvania or Virginia, would have thrown the election into the House. Apparently most Antimasons in Massachusetts voted for him,⁵⁴ but the state was carried by Webster and remained under Whig control.⁵⁵ Adams was "not able positively" to say he was sorry for it,⁵⁶ but he did congratulate himself on the part he had played in Van Buren's election:

I could not help thinking that perhaps my course had saved him his election. When Mr. Hallett's mind was balancing I acted upon it—he in turn acted upon the Antimasonic party here, the party refused to go into a National Convention and thus chilled the action in Pennsylvania. Had a National Convention nominated Harrison, he would have carried Pennsylvania and that would have settled the question—Thus it is that

⁵¹ CFA Diary, June 6, 1836.

⁵² CFA Diary, May 28, 1836; "I was fearful that the slavery question would bring my father up in aid of Mr. Webster again and that thus the State would be swept out of our hands just at the moment we were likely to seize it."

⁵³ CFA Diary, Aug. 27, 1836.

⁵⁴ Eg. See CFA to B. F. Hallett, Nov. 22, 1836.

⁵⁵ Fues, *Webster*, II, 51 gives these figures: Webster—41,287, Van Buren—33,542.

⁵⁶ CFA Diary, Nov. 15, 1836.

great events spring from little causes. I do not at all repent of what I have done.⁵⁷

The time had come, he felt, to retire temporarily from active politics. He did not look forward with any confidence to Van Buren's administration and this set him off from Hallett and Alexander Everett, his former associates.⁵⁸ The parting, however, was amicable. Adams wrote a valedictory piece for the *Advocate* as well as a private note to Hallett in which he proposed "to rest for a time in peace," and recounted with satisfaction his work in trying "to rescue Massachusetts from the Whig grasp." But future support of Van Buren, he added, would "depend... upon his acts." "To them," Adams concluded, "I shall look with considerable anxiety."⁵⁹

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⁵⁷ CFA Diary, Nov. 23, 1836.

⁵⁸ CFA Diary, Nov. 26, 1836.

⁵⁹ CFA to B. F. Hallett, Nov. 22, 1836.

Book Reviews

Erastus Corning, Merchant and Financier, 1794-1872. By Irene D. Neu.
Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York, 1960. Pp. 212. \$4.00

Refining an interest in the "American Industrial Elite" which was evident in her 1952 research, Professor Irene D. Neu has moved from group study to individual case history with a skillful treatment of Erastus Corning, creator of the New York Central Railroad. And, incidentally, Professor Neu has successfully moved from an earlier position of co-author (with George Rogers Taylor in 1956) to complete monopoly of her own manuscript in 1960 when dealing with problems of the American railroad network.

Corning, an eastern business man who could believe not only in Jeffersonian Republicanism but also in Jacksonian Democracy, preceded the era of the giant corporation and nationalization of business. As merchant and financier, his business interests ranged from iron manufacturing, to banking, to land speculation, to railroading. These interests were, of course, inter-related and one business enterprise did not terminate when another began. Rather did Corning become involved in all these business pursuits early in his career, and continue to be engaged in each one of them until his death in 1872.

Almost every Corning financial interest, handled in a topical chapter organization by the author, has within its account a tie-in with major American historical incidents. Corning, as an iron manufacturer, was involved in the building and financing of the *Monitor* and other ironclads in the Civil War. This association, in addition to other profitable government war contracts, could be accomplished without hesitation even though Corning was politically opposed to war and to the Lincoln administration. Corning, the banker, could politically approve of the destruction of the Second Bank of the United States on the grounds that the Bank was an example of federal encroachment on states' rights. Realistically, he could view the Bank of the United States as thwarting New York financial interests in behalf of the interests of Philadelphia, and later, grudgingly but again pragmatically, permit his state bank to become a national bank at the proper time period.

Professor Neu wisely emphasizes that Corning, in his role as railroad president, profitably tied his position to Corning, iron manufacturer and dealer. Investigations brought censure, but did not prevent collaboration. Further emphasis made by the author is that in the creation of the New York Central, Corning, for all his organizational genius, had his blind spots. Although he forged a twenty-three million dollar, three hundred mile railroad network from a four and a half million dollar, seventy-eight mile short line railroad, he never grasped the importance of a dependable rail connection with New York City. Corning relied too heavily on the Hudson River as proper access, and thus strategy perfection was bequeathed

to Vanderbilt. These two, in interesting fashion, seemed not to disapprove of one another, and were somewhat sympathetically kin in the business world of mid-nineteenth century.

Corning's extensive land speculation in both eastern and western states, his involvements with western merchants as well as eastern financiers, plus the fact that "Corning's railroad investments were so widespread that it would have been possible for a traveler at the end of the 1860's to span the continent riding exclusively on lines in which the Albany capitalist had a large interest," made Corning "an important figure in America's economic growth." Students of economic history will be pleased that Professor Neu has added another detailed account to the growing list of studies on American capitalists; students in other areas will be pleased with the readability of a business biography.

WILLIAM T. DOHERTY, JR.

University of Mississippi

The Trumpet Soundeth: William Jennings Bryan and His Democracy, 1896-1912. By Paul W. Glad. University of Nebraska Press, 1960. Pp. xii, 242. Illustrated. \$4.75.

For most Americans who have grown up since World War I the image of William Jennings Bryan is a rather blurred and not very flattering montage composed of Bryan Delivering the Cross of Gold Speech; Bryan, the Three-Time Loser of Presidential Campaigns; Bryan, the Grape Juice Diplomat; and, very prominently, Henry Mencken's Bryan at the Scopes Trial, "... a charlatan, a mountebank, a zany without shame or dignity." In *The Trumpet Soundeth* Professor Paul Glad of Coe College has attempted to rescue the Commoner from his bad historical press by focusing diligent research and a sympathetic approach upon Bryan's role as leader of the opposition party from 1896 to 1912.

To Professor Glad, Bryan represented the peculiar intellectual product of the Middle Border in the last half of the nineteenth century, a product conditioned by the frontier, by the morality of "evangelical, revealed Protestantism," by the ethics of the McGuffey Readers, and by the cultural impact of the Chautauqua movement. To readers interested in intellectual and social history the early chapters of *The Trumpet Soundeth*, those dealing with Bryan's formative years and with his "environment determinants," are likely to be especially rewarding.

As a presidential candidate Bryan was never able to secure the American voters' endorsement of his brand of Populism-Progressivism, but in the twenty years between the Battle of the Standards and America's entry into World War I he had the satisfaction of seeing an impressive list of policies and programs, which made up "Bryanism," enacted into state and national law and embodied in constitutional amendments.

Professor Glad does not, of course, assign exclusively to Bryan the credit for tariff reform, the increasing regulation of business, a graduated

income tax, women's suffrage, or a host of other reforms of this era, but he does clarify Bryan's role in these various movements, and, in the process, makes an effective argument for the thesis that Bryan was "remarkably consistent" in his devotion "to the idea that the people must rule. . . ." Bryan's "consistency and fidelity" to the principle of majority rule, in Glad's mind, account for the apparent (but not real) contradictions involved in the Commoner's positions in respect to such issues as academic freedom and Oriental immigration.

The research, style, and interpretation of *The Trumpet Soundeth* makes it a significant addition to the literature of the Progressive era and mark the author as a most promising member of the new generation of American historians.

J. ROBERT CONSTANTINE

Indiana State Teachers College
Terre Haute

The Constant Captain, Gonzalo de Sandoval. By C. Harvey Gardiner.
Southern Illinois University Press, Carbondale, 1961. Pp. x, 224. \$4.50.

In this work Professor Gardiner draws on his ready knowledge of the conquest of Mexico to put bones and sinews on the shape of the gifted chieftain Gonzalo de Sandoval. In ten tempestuous years 1518-1528 Spain took firm hold of the new world. Those were the years when Sandoval served Cortés as his right arm, in battle and in the more difficult task of ruling over the conquerors and the conquered. He deserves to be remembered, for he was completely trusted by the great captain and he took part in most every significant move of that epochal triumph. His last act of devotion was to accompany his leader back to Spain in 1528. At the end of the voyage he fell sick and died within sight of La Rábida whence Columbus had drawn his great inspiration.

The book is rather a vignette than a full biography, and as such its appeal will be to the general reader. In a way it had to be such a book. For little written record survived the auburn-headed youth and his notable career. Aside from the extended notice given him (later) by Bernal Díaz there are only a few signatures and incidental data in memorial accounts to offer more than a clear outline of his part in the campaign. Accordingly the chief merit of the composition would appear to be a singularly definite sketch of military action and political organizing in that important decade. Here Gardiner is at home with his study of the horses in the conquest and his close acquaintance with its personnel.

The style is interesting though somewhat hurried in spots with repetitious phrases and frequently inverted sentences. The bibliography, almost all in Spanish, limits its entries to works cited in the text. The publisher met his responsibilities with distinction.

W. EUGENE SHIELS, S.J.

Xavier University, Ohio

The Mexican Revolution, 1914-1915: The Convention of Aguascalientes.
By Robert E. Quirk. University of Indiana Press, Bloomington, 1960.
Pp. 325. \$6.25.

This is not just a good book, it is a very good book, clearly, capably and authoritatively written. It is a day by day account of the clash of militarists who for two long years pillaged, murdered, and raped in the cities of Mexico in a fanatical scramble for control of the nation after the passing of Porfirio Díaz. It is the tragic story of the subjugation of 15,000,000 kindly people to the caprices of some 160,000 caudillos, politicians, and soldiers. It is a narrative of armed revolt as opposed to the democratic process of election, a narrative that could have been written of any one of a hundred similar revolutions that plagued Latin America from Bolívar to Fidel Castro. This revolution, fortunately, found a biographer competent to expose for the instruction of students and statesmen the dictator mentality of *políticos* who have dominated in the nations south for a century and a half.

Professor Quirk is brief in setting the scene for his detailed study. Porfirio Díaz, whose benevolent dictatorship had raised Mexico from bankruptcy to prosperity during his role of twenty-six years to 1910, was then eighty years old and was seeking a successor. He failed to find one, but word got abroad and soon the caudillo governors of states and sundry "generals" armed their cohorts to capture the presidency, each wedded to the opinion that his was the only plan for running the government, particularly the ample treasury and profitable oil wells. Madero and Carranza were already in revolt in the northeast, Pancho Villa was in the north, Obregón and Calles were in the northwest, Zapata was in his southern stronghold, and the Porforistas, among them Victoriano Huerta, were holding out in Mexico City. In 1911 Díaz went into exile. Madero succeeded but was completely unwanted, except by interests in the United States, and after the bloody days of February 1913, was assassinated. Huerta held the capital until President Woodrow Wilson joined the chorus of Mexican revolutionaries and decreed: "Huerta must go!" From this point Professor Quirk enlarges on events, carving his fascinating record chiefly from virginal sources.

The central theme is the Convention of Aguascalientes and the three main sources are the personal archive of General Roque González Garza, president of the Convention, the papers in the State Department archives in Washington, and the newspaper collections in both countries. The Convention was called by Carranza, who arrived in Mexico City on August 18, 1914, after General Obregón had made things safe for the First Chief. The description of First Chief Carranza occupying the best home in Mexico, the ousting of civilians from homes, the shooting of "enemies," and the looting is memorable. Only Carrancistas were admitted to the Convention, and Obregón soon ousted all civilians. Thus, the vast bulk of Mexicans was unrepresented, a pattern that was to be followed through the years of the one party system. This was The Revolution. The Convention then went to Aguascalientes where Zapatista and Villista representatives joined

in the chaos. "Citizen" Carranza holed up in Vera Cruz until Obregón had routed Villa and had driven Zapata into his mountain hideaway.

One is appalled at the prevalent inhumanity, the murders, injustices, wanton destructions, eliminations of neutrals and opponents and all who had ability to administer locally and nationally. The most concrete illustration of the mind of The Revolution is the vivid description of "A Meeting of Titans," Zapata and Villa, plotting the destruction of Carranza and casually exchanging men for execution. (Pp. 135-141.) And no less interesting is the chapter on "The Hapless City," which depicts the tragic invasions of the capital. A source of wonderment is the utterly unrealistic attitude of Wilson, Bryan and Lansing, even though American agents, news correspondents, and the foreign diplomatic corps were sending accurate reports on events, indicating the abiding hatred of the United States and its democratic principles on the part of Carranza and the militarists and the hopefulness on the part of the millions in Mexico that the United States would intervene.

A singular omission is noticable. Only once does Professor Quirk refer to the all-important oil interests, and that in passing. As one who lived through later revolutions in Mexico, this reviewer notes that our West Coast oilmen, especially Edward L. Doheny, were backed by Díaz and that prior to his passing the Eastern oilmen were bent upon obtaining concessions. Díaz had granted rights to Doheny on the condition that West Coast interests should never sell out to the East. Huerta, too, favored the condition. Perhaps Professor Quirk intends to cover this subject in his forthcoming study on Wilson's policy.

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Nationalism: A Religion. By Carlton J. H. Hayes. The Macmillan Company, New York, 1960. Pp. vii, 187. \$5.

Just what can a reviewer say about a volume written by a dean of historians, whose influence as a teacher by word and book reaches back into the generations and whose writings have merited numerous medals, honors awards? Professor Emeritus Hayes for forty years has been a keen observer of the origins, manifestations, and effects of nationalism, as his books testify. Now he protests that this present study is not an exhaustive book. "It is simply a précis, a brief summing up, of what one person, through a lifetime of study, has conceived and learned about nationalism, with special regard to its story in Europe and with tentative reflections on its present course on other continents." (P. vi.) It is indeed an admirable summary. It has the familiar Hayes' readability, understandable to general readers, orderly, logical, and gracefully written. It will prove a guide-book in seminars of the future. Scholars will appreciate the broad vision of the veteran scholar.

Hayes brings the customary definition of nationalism into focus with our contemporary world, then surveys the religious sense of man as it survives in Christianity, Hinduism, Buddhism, and Islam, and extends it to the religions of communism and nationalism. In tracing nationalism from primitive social units through its rise to modern political nationalism he finds no continuity of the religious sense in medieval times. However, the roots of modern nationalism were in European Christianity, and its seat was England.

How nationalism became a religion in France during the French Revolution and its advance there and in Europe from 1800 to 1870 is the theme of chapters five and six. The following two chapters reveal the "blatant" nationalism of industrialized society from 1864 to 1914 and the flare-up of nationalist imperialism from 1874 to 1914. Nationalism was the cause of World War I, and its effects were evident in the rise of national groups. Totalitarian nationalism, a newer religion, brought about World War II. The final two chapters are highly thought-provoking: "The Contemporary World and Nationalism," in the cold war, and "Reflections on the Religion of Nationalism." Hayes' final words are a plea to hold fast to the traditions of Christianity in the explosions of the religion of nationalism around the world.

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Notes and Comments

Well Mary: Civil War Letters of a Wisconsin Volunteer, edited by Margaret Brobst Roth and published last year by The University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, does real credit to the earnestness of university presses in preserving the details of Americana. The editor, granddaughter of both the writer and the recipient of these letters, has left the original form intact, even down to homely and ungrammatical expressions, and has included helpful maps and illustrations, a bibliography and necessary annotations. The letters cover the second half of the Civil War, from March, 1863, when John Brobst, a raw western Wisconsin volunteer from the farmland joins the Union Army, through his experiences in various Southern campaigns, to the time when he is mustered out in June, 1865. The psychology of a soldier appears repeatedly throughout the letters—the boredom, the dissatisfaction with conditions, the need of sustaining morale through letters, the boost to the feelings of a floundering young man through actively promoting a cause. The recipient of the letters, Mary Englesby, originally had only a tenuous friendship with Brobst, but through the medium of this correspondence a romance developed, which obviously proved to be Brobst's chief morale-preserver in recurrent periods of low spirits. The University of Wisconsin Press is to be congratulated for the handsome manner in which it has published this book. The list price is \$4.00.—W.R.T.

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A Career Diplomat. The Third Chapter: the Third Reich, by Hugh R. Wilson, Jr., was published by the Vantage Press, in January of this year. Hugh R. Wilson, father of the author, as a career diplomat had produced two books of memoirs, *Education of a Diplomat* and *Diplomat Between Wars*. He had promised a third but owing to his untimely death left the promise unfulfilled. Now his son has presented not a biography or an account of the many diplomatic posts held over the world by Wilson but a collection of his correspondence as Ambassador to Germany from March 3 to October 26, 1938, his Berlin Diary from February 16 to November 15, 1938, and his confidential correspondence from 1938 to September 1939, when he resigned as the last pre-War II

Ambassador to Berlin. Wilson then became a member of the Advisory Committee on Problems of Foreign Affairs under Cordell Hull. The book is short, 112 pages, but gives many interesting details of the problem Hitler had created and interesting observations on the possible outcome of the Nazi moves. The list price is \$2.75.

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A Change and a Parting, My Story of Amana, by Barbara S. Yambura in collaboration with Eunice Willis Bodine, illustrated by Dale Ballantyne, was published last year by the Iowa State University Press, Ames, Iowa. It is a series of vignettes of Amana, a group of seven villages southwest of Cedar Rapids, Iowa, which came to be built in 1855 by German immigrants who had founded the True Inspirationist religion and had arrived in Iowa to live a communal life. It was typical of many such socio-religious enterprises that had sprouted in this country, isolated, utopian, and apart from any higher control than their church elders. Coming to mind immediately are the other like communities: the Quakers, Shakers, Holy Rollers, Zionists, Amish, Mormons, Dunkers, and Dukhobors. Rarely, however, is there a book written by one who had been inside the community. In this case Barbara Yambura did so live and left Amana at the time the economic isolation was failing. As an "outsider" she recalls the people and their way of life in "old Amana." Now the Amanas have adopted the capitalistic system and are widely known for their diversified manufactures, though they maintain the Amana religion. The volume of 361 pages is listed at \$3.50.

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The first volume of *Messages, Addresses, and Public Papers of Luther Hartwell Hodges, Governor of North Carolina*, covering the years 1954-1956, edited by James W. Patton, was published last year by the Council of State of North Carolina at Raleigh. The custom for this set of publications has been to wait until the retirement of a governor before bringing out his writings, and then only in a single volume. Governor Hodges, however, finished the term of the late Governor Umstead from 1954 to 1956, when he was returned to the office for four years, hence a second volume will be needed to cover that period. The present volume is well edited and printed with suitable illustrations and a good index in 691 pages.

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The University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, has performed a noteworthy service to students and teachers plagued by the cost of books by publishing in paper cover *La Follette's Autobiography*, first copyrighted in 1911 as *A Personal Narrative of Political Experiences* by Robert M. La Follette. Allan Nevins in a Foreword indicates the great significance of the work in the battle of the reformers and the Progressives against bossism and the crusading belligerence of Senator Bob of Wisconsin. The book runs to 339 pages in very readable type and is listed at \$1.95. The cloth bound volume is \$6.00.

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The Siege of St. Augustine in 1702, by Charles W. Arnade, is vivid and detailed narrative of the British attack on the venerable Spanish town and fortress of San Agustín in Florida at the beginning of Queen Anne's War. The monograph is only sixty-seven pages in length, but it has been prepared carefully from original documents, maps and charts. Besides facsimiles of contemporary illustrations of the town and fort the pages include excellent maps portraying each naval and infantry movement including the time and numbers involved. While the book is a product of research it is also of interest to general readers. Originally published as No. 3 of the University of Florida Social Science Monography Series, listed at \$2, it is republished now by the St. Augustine Historical Society for \$1, and may be obtained from the University of Florida Press, Gainesville.

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Francisco de Miranda, by Philip John Sheridan, was published last year by The Naylor Company of San Antonio, Texas. The author had no intention of superseding the great works of William Spence Robertson on the "precursor" of the revolution in Latin America nor of re-evaluating the doings of Miranda, but rather he wished to make available a readable and accurate account of the man for the average student. In this he has succeeded. His book is well printed, contains a suitable bibliography and index within its eighty-three pages, and is illustrated. The list price is \$3.

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The Latin Americas, edited by D. L. B. Hamlin, is a collection of papers read in August 1960 during the 29th Couchiching

Conference, sponsored by The Canadian Institute of Public Affairs, with the cooperation of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation. The papers were presented with the purpose of making the Latin Americans better understood in Canada. They are twelve in number, delivered and commented upon by scholars from the nations to our south. They are marked by friendliness and informality, as also are the discussions, and are well worth reading. The paper-bound book of 126 pages is listed at \$1.50 and may be obtained from University of Toronto Press, Toronto 5, Canada.